

Current History

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MAINLAND CHINA, 1970

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Current History

SEPTEMBER, 1970

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In this issue seven articles will review recent events in Mainland China. The first author surveys the military situation and points out that "During the Cultural Revolution, the most important and far-reaching activities of the military have been in the political field. Here their influence has increased greatly although factionalism has been evident. The results have indicated both the value of military support in a power struggle and the ambition of the military leaders."

The Power of the Chinese Military

BY RALPH L. POWELL

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SINCE ITS CREATION in 1927, the Red Army and its successors have played an unusually important role in the Chinese Communist movement. This is not surprising, because the Communist party came to power through more than 20 years of almost constant warfare. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has declared that during the revolution the main form of struggle was war and the main form of organization was the army.¹ The Red Army served not only as a combat force, but also as a labor corps and as a propaganda force.²

During the recent revolutionary wars

most of the present, aging leaders of Communist China, both the Maoists and their opponents, served as either commanders or commissars of the Red Army. After the new Communist regime was established in 1949, the responsibilities of the party expanded greatly. Nevertheless, one-fourth of the members of the Central Committee continued to be military officers³ and there were regularly four to six field marshals on the Politburo. Still, prior to the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960's, the basic concept that "the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party,"⁴ was effectively implemented.

However, following the collapse of the economic Great Leap in the late 1950's and the growing intra-party conflict, Mao Tse-tung chose the armed forces as his principal instrument in the struggle over policy and power. The military leaders, headed by Mao's disciple, Vice Chairman Lin Biao, increased their influence.⁵ But it was during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) that the mili-

¹ *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 269.

² *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 100-101.

³ Donald W. Klein, "The Next Generation of Chinese Communist Leaders," *China Quarterly*, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), pp. 65-66.

⁴ *Selected Military Writings*, p. 272.

⁵ See Ralph L. Powell, "The Increasing Power of Lin Biao and the Party-Soldiers, 1959-1966," *China Quarterly*, No. 34 (April-June, 1968), pp. 38-65.

tary immeasurably expanded their roles and power.

The Cultural Revolution got out of hand. Mao's activist supporters, especially the student Red Guards, became destructive and deeply factionalized. By the winter of 1966–1967 China was on the verge of chaos. The once omnipotent party apparatus and the government structure were being shattered. A political semi-vacuum was being created and the economy was being damaged. The only element of society that still had the organization, discipline and power necessary to move into the vacuum and prevent anarchy was the military. The Cultural Revolution provided both the necessity and the opportunity for greatly increased military influence. Yet even within the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) there was opposition to involving the military in the struggle.⁶

Nevertheless, in January, 1967, in an attempt to achieve his political objectives and prevent anarchy, Mao ordered the armed forces to intervene massively in the Cultural Revolution.⁷ Since Mao is a famous sloganizer, the new missions of the military establishment were soon sloganized as the "three supports and the two military" tasks. These included support for the Maoist revolutionaries, and support for agriculture and for industry. The two new military tasks were military control, imposing a form of martial law where necessary, and military and political training, especially in the schools:

⁶ Peking, New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) in English, January 14, 1967, in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (S.C.M.P.), No. 3862, pp. 1–4.

⁷ *Peking Review*, No. 5 (January 27, 1967), pp. 10–11.

⁸ *The Military Balance, 1967–1968* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 10; Ralph L. Powell, "Military Affairs of Communist China," *Current History*, September, 1966, p. 140.

⁹ *The Military Balance, 1969–1970*, p. 39.

¹⁰ Statement of Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1969; Charles H. Murphy, "China's Place in Nuclear Stakes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 16, 1970, p. 18; Tillman Durdin, "Communist China Orbits Satellite," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1970, p. 1.

¹¹ *Kuan-ming jih-pao* (Peking), February 26, 1967, in S.C.M.P. No. 3893, pp. 31–32; *Peking Review*, No. 10 (March 3, 1967), p. 29 and No. 13 (March 24, 1967), pp. 5–6.

The armed services that were ordered to undertake these new roles are a very large combined force, jointly called the People's Liberation Army. Actually the P.L.A. consists of an army, navy and air force, and special arms and services. These units constitute a modernized military establishment with modern but often not the most advanced weapons and equipment. In 1967, the P.L.A. was believed to consist of about 2.7 million men, most of whom were in a vast land army.⁸ Then, as a result of the expanded missions of the armed forces and the growing Soviet threat, recruitment under a draft system expanded the P.L.A. to perhaps some 3.3 million by 1969.⁹ These forces have great defensive strength and they have more offensive capabilities than the forces of any Asian state except the Soviet Union.

Increasingly, their principal power will come from the very rapid development of a limited nuclear weapons program. Communist China advanced from a first crude atomic test to the explosion of a hydrogen bomb more rapidly than the United States or the Soviet Union. Despite some slowdown apparently caused by the disturbances of the Cultural Revolution, between October, 1964, and September, 1969, Communist China carried out ten nuclear tests, including three hydrogen bomb tests, an underground test and the delivery of an atomic warhead by a missile. In April, 1970, Peking launched an earth satellite that represented an important step toward the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.¹⁰ Still, in recent years most of the energies of the P.L.A. have been expanded in nonmilitary activities.

SOLDIERS IN THE ECONOMY

In the spring of 1967, on orders from the regime, the military commands sent very large numbers of men into the fields, factories and mines under the official slogan "Grasp revolution and promote production."¹¹ The military leaders, who are primarily responsible for the defense of Mainland China, have a vital interest in economic production and in the health of the economy. Hence they have widely supported calls for promot-

ing production, but the heavy purges of military leaders in 1967 indicated that a considerable number of officers opposed the disruptive and radical aspects of the Cultural Revolution.¹² More recently, even critical officers have respected the demonstrated ability of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao to purge powerful members of the opposition. Some have misinterpreted directives and have procrastinated, but none have overtly challenged the regime. All claim to be Maoists, and Mao has involved them in a balance of power game. It is extremely difficult to tell who is loyally serving the regime and who is promoting personal or regional interests. Generally, the military units in economic and other institutions have expended much of their time and energy as propagandists promoting the policies and "thought" of Mao.

When the military intervened in agriculture and industry they did not do so primarily as a labor force. Their principal roles have been supervision, policing and indoctrination. The P.L.A. has neither the manpower nor all the skills necessary directly to manage the economy. Therefore the military have sought to utilize experienced civilian managerial and technical personnel, many of whom had been attacked and purged by radical Maoists. The most serious problem has been factionalism among the revolutionaries, and among them, the cadres (officials) and the P.L.A. units. All three have struggled for greater representation on the "new organs of power," the revolutionary committees. The military—the wielders of the gun—have had the advantage and have played a leading role in establishing these new administrative committees.

Recognizing the major political and strategic value of the communications networks, the armed forces took over the railways, the

airlines and part or all of the telecommunications systems during the Cultural Revolution.¹³ The Railway and Signal Corps troops of the P.L.A. have more skills in these fields than the armed services have in many industries. Thus, in the case of the vital communications and transportation systems, the P.L.A. has not only guarded them, it has directly supervised them.

In early 1967, the military even seized radio stations and some provincial newspapers that were not already in the hands of "loyal Maoists."¹⁴ Troops held the stations and presses until civilian Maoists could take over these critical means of propaganda and indoctrination, but even now the military leaders in the provinces have considerable influence over the mass media.

As the number of revolutionary committees increased, some economic functions that had been supervised by the armed forces were turned over to the new committees. However, with the general exception of the lower-level rural committees, the military have tended to dominate the committees.¹⁵ Although reduced in numbers, P.L.A. units are still scattered throughout the country in many factories, railway offices and some agricultural brigades. The military leaders still hold many of the economic levers of power and control.

The armed forces have made important contributions to the economy in a time of trouble. Given the disruptions and factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, and the decline in the authority and morale of the cadres, if the P.L.A. had not intervened, the industrial economy would have been more seriously damaged. Communications would have been badly, perhaps fatally, disrupted. In agriculture, the greatest contributions of the armed forces have been the provision of heavy equipment and organized help in times of natural disasters, but the troops have also created ill will by serving as grain and tax collectors.

EDUCATORS AND POLICEMEN

Aside from their important activities in the economic sector, the military have played

¹² R. L. and H. F. Powell, "Continuity and Purge in the PLA," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February, 1968, pp. 20-27.

¹³ Radio Peking, February 5, 1967; *Current Background* (C.B.), No. 852 (May 6, 1968), pp. 46-53.

¹⁴ C.B., No. 852, pp. 43-51; Radio Tsinan Domestic in Mandarin, February 17, 1967.

¹⁵ *Current Scene*, April 15, 1970, p. 6.

a major role in "education." In the summer of 1966, the secondary schools and colleges of China were closed in order to revolutionize the educational system and to utilize activist students as Red Guards, the "revolutionary successors" and "vanguards of the Cultural Revolution."¹⁶ However, the aroused students rapidly got out of hand. Instead of acting like "selfless socialist vanguards," the Red Guards became factionalized, violent and disruptive of order and production.

Subsequently, they were officially accused of factionalism, ambition and anarchism.¹⁷ By early 1967, the Maoist regime was already trying, with little success, to persuade the students to return to school. In order to help stabilize the situation, the regular armed forces were ordered into the schools to give "political and military training."¹⁸ The military training consisted primarily of an attempt to inculcate a modicum of discipline into the revolutionary students, while political training consisted basically of propagating the "thought of Mao Tse-tung."

FAILURE IN THE SCHOOLS

The armed forces were largely unsuccessful in the role of educators during the Cultural Revolution. The soldiers were not qualified to teach and many teachers were loath to return to schools where they had been humiliated and even physically attacked by radical students. The fractured national leadership could not agree on a philosophy of education; hence, it was almost impos-

sible to establish curricula. Also, until mid-1968, the activist students had very powerful, radical patrons in Peking. The military were not permitted to use force against the students¹⁹ and their attempts at persuasion were not very effective. The students, who were better educated than the soldiers, resented them and tended to look down on them, a situation that was not happy for either the students or the military.

A VAST MIGRATION

By mid-1968, Mao himself turned against the Red Guard students, who had been a great disappointment to him.²⁰ Literally by the millions, students and intellectuals were sent down to the farms to work as peasants.²¹ This vast migration has been motivated by strategic and economic, as well as political, factors and the armed forces have played a major role, including encouraging deportees to forsake "self-interest" and labor as peasants in the countryside.²² It was officially reported that in 1968 alone some 60 to 70 thousand college "graduates" had been sent to the farms of the P.L.A. to be reeducated by the soldiers and "tempered" by labor.²³ College graduates who have ended up laboring on military farms presumably were activists and troublemakers who had earned the displeasure of the military or the regime.

Although the military were not very successful in policing the schools, they were actually given a vastly larger police role in society. The civil police were closely associated with and controlled by the party; thus, when the party and state structures were assaulted, the radicals also attacked the Public Security Bureaus. Very rapidly the police offices throughout China were disrupted. Both political and common crimes increased sharply and the P.L.A. was ordered in to serve as a gendarmerie,²⁴ in order to prevent anarchy and to preserve order. However, the use of the armed services as a police force helped further to overextend the P.L.A., and the military began to organize police reserve units under many different names. They employed not only reliable peasants and workers, but also "liberated" (rehabili-

¹⁶ *Decision of the Central Committee . . . Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ Stanley Karnow, "China Opens Campaign to Muffle Red Guards," *Washington Post*, September 4, 1968, p. A1; also August 20, 1968, p. C12.

¹⁸ *Peking Review*, No. 11 (March 15, 1968), p. 5.

¹⁹ C.B., No. 852 (May 6, 1968), pp. 115-116.

²⁰ *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1968, p. A32; *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 24, 1968, p. 3.

²¹ *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1969, p. A5.

²² *People's Daily*, July 19, 1968.

²³ Peking N.C.N.A. in English, February 11, 1969.

²⁴ See S.C.M.P., No. 3891, p. 12; No. 4139, p. 5 and No. 4157, p. 4; Moscow *Tass* International in English, February 9, 1967.

tated) police officials, whose skills were essential.²⁵

During shifts in official policy toward the left, the troops were ordered to use only persuasion against revolutionaries. Violence increased and conditions deteriorated. Then, after Mao turned against the Red Guards and authorized the military to use force where necessary, internal stability and authoritarianism again increased. This indicates that the armed forces have had considerable capability and willingness to reestablish law and order, when ordered to do so.

PREPARATIONS AGAINST ATTACK

The vastly expanded roles and missions of the P.L.A. tended seriously to overextend the armed forces at the very time when Sino-Soviet relations were further deteriorating and the U.S.S.R. was building up its military might along the Chinese borders. This situation must have created a terrible dilemma for the senior staff and command officers of the P.L.A. who were primarily responsible for national defense. Evidence indicates that, beginning in 1968, the military reduced their activities in nonstrategic areas, especially in the vast agrarian economy. Yet the P.L.A. has not been able fully to withdraw from these non-military and often thankless functions. The armed forces had been sent to many areas and institutions because of nearly chaotic conditions. Until effective governmental and managerial structures are reconstructed, the military cannot withdraw without weakening law and order and the stability of the economy.

Some six months before the publicized border clashes with the Soviet Union began in March, 1969, the Chinese began what be-

came a massive campaign to prepare against attack. These preparations have included the further dispersal of industry, the storage of foodstuffs, the building of air raid shelters, military training and a vast propaganda campaign carried out in part by the military.²⁶ The campaign has sought not only to strengthen national security, but also to unify a disunited people behind the Mao-Lin regime.

POLITICAL ROLES OF THE P.L.A.

During and since the Cultural Revolution, the most important and far-reaching activities of the military have been in the political field. Here their influence has increased greatly, although factionalism has been evident. The results have indicated both the value of military support in a power struggle and the ambition of the military leaders.

When the P.L.A. was ordered to intervene in the Cultural Revolution in January, 1967, much of China was suffering violence and the breakdown of local government. Consequently, in most of the provinces the military were directed to establish military control committees, usually a temporary form of martial law.²⁷ These military committees were among the least publicized aspects of the Cultural Revolution, but when the reorganization of the political structure in the

(Continued on page 175)

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²⁵ "Problems of Disorder in China," *Asian Analyst*, August, 1968, p. 20; *Kung-an hung-ch'i* (Canton), No. 7 (October 31, 1967), in S.C.M.P., No. 4077, pp. 3-4.

²⁶ *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 4, 1969, p. 6; *The New York Times*, December 28, 1969 and January 28, 1970, p. 11.

²⁷ Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967," *China Quarterly*, No. 34 (April-June, 1968), p. 7 & p. 12. Scattered Chinese press and radio references account for military control committees in 18 provinces.

In discussing the policies of the various factions in the Chinese leadership, this author says, "As far as one can gather, foreign policy in China today is made by Chou [En-lai] . . . and, to some extent, by Lin Piao himself. . . ."

Chinese Factionalism and Sino-Soviet Relations

BY URI RA'ANAN

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THERE IS A murky twilight zone where Chinese factional struggles and international policy considerations meet and overlap. In this context, the term "international policy considerations" refers, of course, primarily to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

For a start, it is necessary to examine whether, and how far, the foreign policy and international strategy platforms and slogans which the competing Chinese factions propagated on the eve of the Great Cultural Revolution (1965–1966) can provide us with relevant clues and guidelines for Chinese policies today, when some of the factions have been clearly defeated and others have been relatively, although presumably not irrevocably, successful.

It may be something of an oversimplification, but it can nevertheless be helpful to regard factions within Communist parties as being essentially feudal entities—that is to say, they are based primarily on links of personal allegiance between chieftains and retainers, in a descending pyramid of fealties and dependencies. Communist factions usually antedate and outlast the emergence of

particular domestic or foreign policy problems; however, they do make very good tactical use of such issues, employing them as convenient slogans which can be raised like banners around which a group within the leadership may rally its supporters. This is a useful expedient, given the esoteric and conspiratorial approach towards public communication which is typical of Communist parties and societies. It is not usually deemed proper or decent in a Communist country to refer publicly to the existence of factions—at least not until an opposing faction has been safely liquidated and its members can be denounced as schismatics, posthumously, so to speak. Consequently, whenever competing groups in the leadership attempt to rally supporters from the important upper middle strata of the party, army, and state cadres, they must resort to esoteric signals. Given the nature of Communist regimes, these must be of a politico-ideological nature.

Thus, the reiteration of certain political slogans and the omission of others—whether in the press or at an annual parade—serves pretty much the same purpose in Communist societies as did the battle cries of the Guelfs and the Ghibellines in the medieval Italian city states, namely to encourage one's supporters and to frighten the followers of one's opponents. The initiated—and most cadres

* *Editor's note:* This article is based upon a paper delivered at the Airlie House China Conference in the fall of 1969, which will be part of a forthcoming book, *20 Years of Communist China*, edited by John P. Hardt and Professor Harold C. Hinton.

from the middle ranks upward belong to this category—normally understand Aesopian language extremely well, since their careers and, sometimes, their lives depend on their ability to read between the lines. The Wall Newspapers of the Red Guards provided repeated and unusually detailed examples that demonstrated how accurately seemingly obscure slogans could be interpreted not only by cadres but sometimes even by students and by some workers.

In any case, if it is true that policy issues perform a primarily tactical task in Communist intra-party struggles, it follows that a policy platform adopted by a faction in the heat of battle may be conveniently jettisoned once victory is won. There are many instances of this tendency in the pages of Soviet history: Joseph Stalin defeated Leon Trotsky only to adopt Trotsky's slogan of rapid industrialization, and Nikita Khrushchev vanquished Georgi Malenkov only to pick up Malenkov's banner of championing consumer goods.

Nevertheless, examples may also be found in the chronicles of the Sino-Soviet conflict: Chairman Mao Tse-tung at one time propagated the thesis that "the U.S.S.R. is the head of the socialist camp," in order to indicate that responsibility both for China's military protection and for her economic sustenance rested squarely on Moscow, the Communist elder brother. Subsequently, however, it was the Kremlin that came to insist on this very slogan, to demonstrate a very different concept, namely, that China owed respect and obedience to the "First Socialist State."

In view of such vagaries, how far can the shibboleths of a period of factional conflict provide the analyst with reliable clues to attitudes and policies which may be adopted once either of the rival groups has won? When we first attempted to deal with this problem, during the Chicago conference on China in 1967, there could not really be a satisfactory answer. In 1970, however, there

may be a pragmatic way of tackling this issue: very simply, one can attempt to compare the actions and statements of Peking *now* with the slogans of the Lin Piao faction in 1965–1966. One realizes, of course, that there is no conclusive evidence that 1969–1970 marks the final victory of Lin Piao. Most analysts believe that an uneasy coalition of at least three groups governs Peking today. However, there is no question that Lin's major opponents in the 1965–1966 foreign policy "debate" have been decisively defeated and ousted during the last two years so that, at the very least, it may be assumed that supporters of one side of that "debate" are reasonably well ensconced in Peking at the moment and the others are out of power. Consequently, a comparison between the slogans and actions of 1965–1966 and of 1969–1970 respectively may be of some relevance.

First of all, it is necessary to summarize the positions on foreign policy and strategy adopted by the various Peking factions in 1965–1966.¹ Briefly, a struggle took place in 1965 between competing groups in the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.); the contest was fought over ostensibly military issues and became linked to somewhat broader international questions which, to be sure, were logically related to strategic problems. Each of the military groups looked for allies and supporters among the party and state cadres. Although actually there were more than two factions within the P.L.A.—as has been amply demonstrated during the Cultural Revolution—the two primary contestants in 1965 were what might be called the "professionals," under Lo Jui-ch'ing and the "guerrillas" under Lin Piao.

"PROFESSIONALS" AND "GUERRILLAS"

The "professionals" tended to view war with the West as a real and likely contingency, which could be avoided only through reliance on the Soviet nuclear deterrent, since China's own nuclear development at the time was too recent and too feeble. In addition, they urgently demanded the creation of a modernized and highly mobile Chinese strik-

¹ For details and documentation, see my paper in *China in Crisis*, edited by Tang Tsou (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), Vol. II, chapter 2.

ing force which could move, if necessary, into territories beyond China's frontiers and especially into Vietnam. This approach necessitated still further reliance on the U.S.S.R.—the only country which, at that stage, could provide China with the necessary sophisticated conventional air, naval, armored and missile equipment.

The P.L.A. "professionals" were fully aware that there would be tremendous resistance in Peking to the concessions and adjustments which alone could open the way to such a rapprochement with Moscow; consequently, they sought both civilian allies and a "gimmick" through which their plan could be "sold" under the guise of militancy. (In fact, Lo Jui-ch'ing and his friends were simply "waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.") The obvious way to achieve their aim was to suggest "unity of action" with Moscow in Vietnam, in other words, joint military moves which would clearly presuppose some kind of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. For entirely different reasons related to the state of the Chinese economy and the need for Soviet industrial and technical aid, certain civilian cadres (including, at that stage, both Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing) apparently tended to support Lo Jui-ch'ing's platform.

On the other hand, Lin Piao and the "guerrillas" rejected the very basis of this approach. They denied the likelihood of an early confrontation with the West and the consequent necessity for urgent military steps of the kind that Lo Jui-ch'ing had suggested. The "guerrillas" opposed the concept of major Chinese military moves into areas like Vietnam; they stressed the fact that "Peoples' War" served the essentially diversionary purpose of keeping would-be adversaries busy outside China and consequently should be fought primarily with local resources and without involving the Chinese directly. Lin's famous essay left no doubt that, in his opinion, the Vietnamese and the other friends of Peking should depend almost entirely upon "self reliance" in fighting their battles. Implicit in Lin's doctrine was the belief that the West, if not directly provoked, would leave China alone; as for the more distant future,

Lin apparently felt that, in case of a serious Sino-American clash, the prospect of encountering China's own nuclear development and perhaps a hundred million Chinese warriors, however ill-equipped, would be sufficient to deter the United States.

If, indeed, Lin's premises were sound, then there was no need to make concessions to the "revisionist" enemy in Moscow, since neither his nuclear deterrent nor his conventional military assistance would be required. On the contrary, there was good reason to regard the men in Moscow as more dangerous and more immediate enemies than the men in Washington. The United States, after all, had become a primarily *external* opponent, especially since the United States had clearly "leashed" Chiang Kai-shek; the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, was not only engaged in overtly hostile action along China's borders from India all the way to Outer Mongolia but, more important, had a finger and perhaps a whole hand in China's domestic conflicts, as the behavior of the Lo Jui-ch'ing clique (and its platform) seemed to show. Consequently, the Lin Piao group and certain of its civilian associates emphasized the fact that not only must serious conflict with the West be postponed until the Soviet enemy had been finally overcome but that it might be possible and even necessary to reach a temporary understanding with the United States. This was suggested by some of Lin's allies in the spring of 1965. A more detailed blueprint for such a policy was presented by Chou En-lai in the spring of 1966. At that time, Lin had already removed the Lo Jui-ch'ing faction from power, so that Chou thought it wise to join what was rapidly becoming the "victorious Mao-Lin Piao" group.

If this was the platform on which the P.L.A. "guerrillas" fought and defeated their adversaries, the question arises whether this remains China's policy. One can presumably regard the period of overt domestic strife, the Great Cultural Revolution, as having virtually ended some time between the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee in October, 1968, and the Ninth Congress of the C.C.P. in April, 1969. Probably it is not

too farfetched to regard the ruling group which has emerged from the struggle as consisting (apart from Mao himself) of an uneasy coalition between the Lin Piao faction, a Chiang Ch'ing faction, Chou En-lai and his associates in the state bureaucracy and, finally, several veteran military leaders who are not necessarily Lin Piao's adherents. Of these, only two—that is, the Lin Piao and the Chou En-lai groups—have been fairly consistently engaged in enunciating views on international questions, both in 1965–1966 and in recent months. As far as this particular issue is concerned, there is no overt sign that their opinions differ too sharply, except perhaps for the fact that Chou himself does not appear to have invariably demonstrated as much anti-Soviet feeling as other leaders in Peking.

Does this mean that there have been no further serious factional conflicts over international policy and strategy, because the proponents of the pro-Moscow line, Lo Jui-ch'ing and, to a lesser extent, Lui Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, are now safely out of the way? There is little overt evidence on the subject. Yet detailed study of Soviet broadcasts to China and of other Soviet publications concerning Chinese developments indicates that the U.S.S.R., at any rate, suspects that such conflicts still exist or that there is at least sufficient difference of outlook in China on these questions to warrant Soviet attempts to fish in troubled Chinese waters. In this connection, it is of interest that Lin Piao, in his important address to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party (C.C.P.) of April, 1969, found it necessary to speak defensively about Peking's rejection of Aleksei Kosygin's proposal to establish telephonic communication with the Chinese leadership. Lin insisted that contact with Moscow should be confined to regular diplomatic channels. Is it possible that some elements in Peking were pressing for the acceptance of Kosygin's suggestion? Did Lin insist on regular diplomatic channels because he feared that Moscow might otherwise be

able to play off one faction in Peking against another?

SOVIET GRADING OF LEADERS

It is perhaps significant that, in the last two years or so, Soviet publications have subtly graded leading Chinese personalities other than Mao in four categories, which range from the hopelessly hostile to those who, at least by inference, are deemed by Moscow to be tolerable.

The first and, from the Soviet point of view, the worst clique is Mao's "court"—and Moscow keeps using this expression—including, of course, Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, his former political secretary, Ch'en Po-ta, his security organizer, K'ang Sheng, as well as Yao Wen-yüan, who is reported (by the Soviets) to be Mao's son-in-law, and Mao's former bodyguard, Wang Tung-hsing.

The second category includes Lin Piao himself (and some very surprising statements about him have been made in the U.S.S.R. recently).

The third group includes Chou En-lai, who is mentioned and attacked personally far less often than the others and whose name was significantly omitted from the recent Wang Ming statement criticizing the Peking leadership.

The fourth and, by inference, the most pro-Soviet group, contains the purged leaders, including Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whose fates are deplored (at least by inference). The Maoist attacks against these men are ridiculed by the Russians.

To return to Lin Piao for a moment, a recent issue of Moscow's *New Times*² is of great interest, although the tune which it plays has been heard from the Kremlin for some time. *New Times* states:

It is well known that the Chinese Army's leading clique is split by a klan struggle. . . . Certain local military leaders are continuing to gamble on the "1 August" grouping, on which they have relied previously. Others are openly oriented towards the "8 September" clique, supported by Chiang Ch'ing. . . . Mao is in no hurry to decisively strengthen one of these groups at the expense of weakening the other. In addition, his idea is

² *New Times*, No. 37, Sept., 1969.

that they should both oppose the group of the Chairman's successor himself, Lin Piao. However, both before the Congress and now, the Army leaders headed by Lin Piao, feeling that Mao's undivided domination in the country was coming to an end, have been striving to avoid exacerbating the internal struggle among the military. . . .

The article goes on to stress that border fighting with the Soviet Union has been utilized by Lin Piao (to strengthen the army's control over the countryside and to absorb further groups of peasants) and, on the other hand, by Mao's civilian faction (which has tried to strengthen its hold over the industrial workers). *New Times* then adds that Mao's emissaries, who were sent to pick delegates for the Ninth Party Congress, were resisted in the provinces by the military and concludes, "The complex tactical alliance between Mao and . . . Lin Piao obviously is no longer as firm as it used to be. . . . Lin Piao, although officially declared heir, cannot be . . . entirely confident that he will really succeed in becoming Mao's successor"; he will be opposed both by the new party apparatus and the old state apparatus, presumably meaning Chou En-lai.

To this analyst it seems that *New Times* and similar Soviet publications contain thinly veiled hints to Lin Piao that, although he is separated by deep differences from the U.S.S.R., he is about to be betrayed by Mao and attacked both by the militants under Chiang Ch'ing and by Chou En-lai's state apparatus; consequently, he would be well advised to take a new look at his relationship with Moscow. As early as January, 1969, Soviet broadcasts to China warned Lin Piao personally that Mao and Chiang Ch'ing were plotting to replace him with Mao's son-in-law, Yao Wen-yüan, who was allegedly slated to become Mao's real successor.

Such allegations give rise to a major question: Are we to believe that Lin Piao's hostility to the Soviet Union has seriously diminished since Peking's foreign policy "debate" of 1965-1966? So far there is little indication that the Kremlin itself believes this to be the case. It would seem rather that Moscow is simply trying to exploit the continuing power

struggle within the Peking leadership. Since the Russians regard the Cultural Revolution clique under Chiang Ch'ing as hopelessly discredited and almost irredeemably anti-Soviet, they prefer to keep the door slightly open to Lin Piao, hoping that he too will fade away eventually and that more amenable personalities will finally prevail in Peking's party or state apparatus. At the same time, the Kremlin may also be intending to put pressure on Chou En-lai (by demonstrating that Chou is not Moscow's only iron in the fire).

To be sure, on the evidence both of actions and statements during the last year or two, Moscow has very little cause to regard any of the factions within the present uneasy Peking coalition as really amenable to Soviet pressure or inducements. As far as one can gather, foreign policy in China today is made by Chou (whose former associate Ch'en Yi has been demoted, only to be replaced by another of Chou's cronies, Li Hsien-nien) and, to some extent, by Lin Piao himself, who is the only major leader to have delivered important foreign policy pronouncements. Whichever group may be exerting predominant influence, the pronouncements and the actions of the present regime differ only very slightly from the platform which Lin Piao and his various associates advocated during the 1965-1966 "debate."

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S.

Thus, it would appear to be a fair assumption that, after winning the upper hand (although not yet the final victory), the P.L.A. "guerrilla" group has proceeded more or less consistently to implement its 1965-1966 foreign policy and strategy "line." This applies equally to China's posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. For instance, the Lin Piao group in 1965-1966 reversed the order of priorities and stressed the fact that the battle against the Soviet "revisionists" would have to be fought through "to the end" before China could confront the United States—in other words, that a showdown with the West was being postponed until the Greek Calends.

Admittedly, recent Chinese pronounce-

ments—including Lin Piao's address to the Ninth Congress and a joint editorial in *People's Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* on August 1, 1969 (the 42nd anniversary of the P.L.A.)—no longer employ precisely the same terms, but they clearly imply that this order of priorities still holds. While much is made of the alleged collusion between Washington and Moscow and the hypothesis of an attack upon China by both is occasionally entertained, no doubt is left that the Soviet Union is the immediate enemy. Thus, repeated reference is made to the feasibility of an early overthrow of the Leonid Brezhnev regime in Moscow, but nowhere is the removal of the United States leadership envisaged. This is surely consistent with the old Lin Piao line of regarding the Soviet Union as the real opponent. Since the Russians persistently fish in China's domestic waters, they have to be repaid in the same coin—with a Chinese attempt to play off competing factions within the Kremlin. In this connection, it may be significant that while earlier Chinese pronouncements attacked Aleksei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgorny, and, occasionally, Aleksandr Shelepin as well, recently Peking has concentrated its denunciations by name on Brezhnev alone. Anyone aware of the obsession of Communist regimes with internal security and their belief in the supremacy of the domestic power base over all other policy considerations must realize that any attempt by an outsider—whether anti-Communist or Communist—to tamper with the internal problems of a Communist state constitutes the final, the most unforgivable insult.

The United States, on the other hand, although it is regarded as an *external* opponent, is not viewed by Peking as a major threat to Chinese internal security. It may be significant that, on November 25, 1968, simultaneously with the offer to resume the Warsaw talks, the Chinese press suddenly republished in full a speech made by Mao in March, 1949, containing the following remarkable and topical paragraph:

Whether . . . peace negotiations are overall or local, we should be prepared for such an even-

tuality. We should not refuse to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a haze. We should be firm in principle; we should also have all the flexibility . . . necessary for carrying out our principles.

While the accompanying editorials in the three major Chinese organs did not draw special attention to this paragraph, the fact remains that it was uncannily reminiscent of a similar passage published at the height of the attack by Lin Piao's "guerrillas" against Lo Jui-ch'ing's "professionals" in May, 1965;

Providing the basic interests of the people are not violated, it is perfectly permissible and even necessary to conduct negotiations with the imperialists and to reach certain agreements with them on certain occasions.

Consequently, there are sound reasons for thinking that the current posture in Peking both toward the U.S.S.R. and toward the United States bears strong resemblance to the Lin Piao platform of 1965, although some minor changes should be noted with regard to strategic questions. Thus, in 1965, Lo Jui-ch'ing repeatedly accused Lin of having failed to make the necessary military preparations for a possible confrontation with the West, while Lin indicated that such a contingency was remote and could in any case be met by a resort to traditional guerrilla tactics. In recent statements, however, including Lin's report to the Ninth Congress of the C.C.P., it was stressed that:

We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war and against their launching a war at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and against their launching a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared.

Although this statement referred both to the United States and to the U.S.S.R., there is little doubt but that it is the latter whom Lin really had in mind especially considering that his address was delivered a few weeks after the Ussuri River fighting. In 1965, Lin rejected the hypothesis of a United States invasion, but, in 1969–1970 a Soviet attack could by no means be ruled out; consequently, there had been a slight change in the

strategic posture of the Lin Piao faction. However, even now, Lin is very careful to stress that "we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. If they insist on fighting we will keep them company and fight to the finish." Of course, what has changed since 1965 is both the strategic disposition of the Soviet Union and its overall posture. Since the ominous December, 1966, Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, whose contents were never revealed but which almost certainly dealt with possible Soviet moves against China (and which was followed by confidential party cell meetings of Soviet military and civilian cadres in the Far East), the number of Soviet operative units along China's frontiers has at least tripled, and their fire power has increased tenfold or more. The former deputy commander of the Soviet missile forces, Vladimir Tolubko, has become commander of the Soviet Far Eastern military district, and Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles are believed to have been emplaced there. It is a fact that in the intervening period the Soviet Union has invaded another Communist country, Czechoslovakia, and, to China's evident shock, has enunciated a doctrine of "limited sovereignty" (the Brezhnev Doctrine)** concerning all Communist states, thus justifying future military intervention in countries like China.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA

What is more, the Soviet Union has formally defined what has, in any case, been its policy since the early 1960's, namely, the encirclement of China, by openly calling for an "Asian security system" which would surround China from the south as well as from the north and the west. Finally, two bloody series of incidents occurred in 1969, the latter of which, in Sinkiang, was undoubtedly due to Soviet initiative and provided some disturbing evidence of the desire of Soviet units to remain on Chinese soil as long as possible. These developments were accompanied by a

violent campaign of Soviet incitement aimed at the non-Han minorities in Sinkiang and in Inner Mongolia. To cap it all, the Soviet Union proceeded to leak various reports and rumors concerning a proposed invasion of China's border territories or a possible knock-out strike against her nuclear facilities. To be sure, these leaks might have been intended primarily to serve the purpose of "flying a kite," i.e., to test possible United States reactions, before the Kremlin makes its final decision.

This behavior pattern bears an uncanny resemblance to Soviet moves in July, 1968, when rival Kremlin factions were arguing about the wisdom of invading Czechoslovakia, with the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin apparently claiming that such a militant move might not be altogether "safe." A "kite was flown" then, in similar fashion, to test Western reaction and, at that time, unfortunately, the United States response was, at least implicitly, to reassure Moscow that the West would remain inactive in such a regrettable contingency. This reaction, of course, cut the ground from under the feet of the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin and thus may well have helped to ensure a Soviet decision to invade Prague. The Chinese, significantly, are obsessed by this precedent and ever since the communiqué ending the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in October, 1968, they have stressed their belief that "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique enjoys the tacit consent and support of the United States in openly dispatching troops to occupy Czechoslovakia." Their concern is clear and the reason for it is obvious.

There are sound reasons for believing that Peking's attempt, at the end of 1968, to resume contact with the United States at Warsaw and elsewhere was at least partly conditioned by the feeling that China and the United States, if they but realized it, had parallel interests in supporting autonomous, nationalist regimes in East Europe against Soviet aggression. (This certainly applies to Rumania and perhaps even to Yugoslavia.) Above all, it seems that the Chinese are now

** *Editor's note:* See Kurt London, "The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth," *Current History*, April, 1969, p. 197.

concerned lest Washington repeat the error that preceded the invasion of Prague and emit noises which are not sufficiently sinister and ambiguous to discourage would-be Soviet interventionists from acting against China. The Chinese apparently believe that there is now a factional struggle in the Kremlin over the question of a possible move against Peking (similar to Moscow's intramural "debate" on the eve of the Czech invasion); Peking seems to think that now, as then, it might be possible for the West to strengthen the Soviet anti-interventionist group by means of steps which would "orchestrate," in credible fashion, a United States posture so stern and forbidding that the Kremlin would have to feel uneasy about possible repercussions along Russia's western frontiers in the event of Soviet action against China. From this point of view, it is dubious whether last year's "Richardson declaration"**** alone was sufficiently strong and clear to serve such a purpose. To be really effective, it would certainly have to be "orchestrated" by moves as well as words. Some such action is vital to Western interests.

Since December, 1966, the Kremlin seems to have envisaged several alternate scenarios in relation to China: a) that perhaps certain local anti-Mao elements, preferably in non-Han areas close to the Soviet borders, such as Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia or Manchuria, would seize power, would secure approach roads and airfields and "call in" the Soviets; or b) that the U.S.S.R. would come in to help one of the anti-Maoist factions seize power in Peking itself; or c) that Russia would deliver a sudden "knock-out" strike against China's nuclear facilities.

Option A was temporarily foreclosed when the Great Cultural Revolution removed men like Ulanfu from power in Inner Mongolia, as well as similar elements in Manchuria; option B is not too feasible for the moment, in view of Lo Jui-ch'ing's overthrow; option C, however, remains to tempt the militant faction in Moscow. The Chinese, apparently, took pains on the Ussuri

and, to a lesser extent, in Sinkiang, to demonstrate that all these options would prove most bloody and expensive for Moscow—that there is, in fact, no Chinese military leader who would act like the Czech commander, Martin Dzur, i.e., who would permit the Russians to advance without terrible casualties. Thus, the memory of Prague may be the real key to the Ussuri.

It could hardly be in the interest of the West to see the Soviets succeeding either a) in dismembering China's outer provinces or b) in installing a pro-Soviet regime in Peking, or c) in reducing China to the status of a satellite at the Red Army's mercy by removing China's one "equalizer," i.e., her nuclear deterrent. In fact, the continuation of the present Moscow-Peking-Washington "triangle" ensures the balance of power, and thus, indirectly, enhances stability; consequently, Moscow's success in eliminating the third factor in this equation might well prove disastrous. Moreover, Western observers would be ill-advised to console themselves, in case of such a contingency, by banking on a prolonged Soviet military involvement in China, a kind of "tenfold Vietnam"; actually, the military odds are that the Russians, if permitted to act with impunity, might be rapidly successful in obtaining their immediate objectives. Such a development could not be in the best interests of the West; consequently, steps should be taken to deter the Kremlin, as far as possible.

It is within this context that the temporary victory of the Lin-Mao group (with its anti-Soviet outlook) is helpful to the West; clearly the Lin-Mao faction will make it far more difficult for the Kremlin to "deal" with China than would the supremacy of rival elements in Peking that are more likely to prove amenable to Soviet influence.

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**** Editor's note: For excerpts of the statement by Elliot Richardson, see p. 173.

"How far Sino-Japanese trade relations can stretch depends in large part upon China's internal political situation. The Japanese were heartened that as the Cultural Revolution quieted, Chou En-lai apparently gained control of China's diplomatic apparatus. Tokyo believed it could work out a long-term policy with Chou. The Chinese view of such a policy, however, depended not only upon Chou's ascendancy, but also upon four other Japanese policies."

China and Japan: Different Beds, Different Dreams

BY WALTER LAFEVER

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DURING THE 1960's, official Sino-Japanese relations soured at the same time that Japan emerged as a world power. The two events were closely related. Throughout most of the 1950's, Asian affairs were managed within a bipolar world dominated by the Sino-Soviet bloc and the United States-West European alliance. Between the late 1950's and the early 1960's, the bipolarity splintered. The supposed Communist monolith became polycentric; West European colonial powers surrendered Asian outposts; and the United States assumed an increasingly powerful position in the western Pacific. As the West Europeans disappeared from the scene, Japan, the greatest economic power in Asia, became a key United States partner in the containment of communism.¹

Thus, in 1969, when President Richard Nixon announced his "Nixon Doctrine" of a decreased American presence in Asia, Japan was clearly the force which Nixon believed would be able to fill the vacuum over the long term.

As the President stated in his February, 1970, "State of the World" message:

Our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts to help other Asian nations develop in peace. Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

No nation is more acutely aware than Mainland China of the Nixon Doctrine and its implications for Japan. This awareness is creating a paradoxical, deep-rooted shift in Sino-Japanese relations. On the one hand, trade between the two nations booms; on the other hand, the Japanese are concerned about Chinese nuclear weapons, and Peking lashes out bitterly at Tokyo's many diplomatic and commercial successes in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Siberia and Okinawa. China is especially sensitive about the growing Japanese military establishment.

Along with the shattering of the bipolar world and the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, another factor shapes Sino-Japanese affairs: Chinese diplomacy has undergone a fundamental transformation since the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960's. Before that upheaval, Peking used conventional diplomacy and traditional power alliances in an attempt to join forces with other selected

¹ For the historical background of Sino-Japanese relations and the developments in 1950-1968, see "China and Japan: A Matter of Options," *Current History*, September, 1968, pp. 153ff.

governments (especially Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Pakistan and certain African regimes) to form a third force "united front" against the Soviets and the Americans. By working with these governments, the Chinese attempted to form this "united front" from above. A subsequent series of diplomatic disasters, particularly in Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam, led to a foreign policy reorientation which was an integral part of the Cultural Revolution. Out of this new orientation emerged China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung's indirect collaboration with mass revolutionary forces and "oppressed nations" in a new attempt to find a third force against the two superpowers. Cooperation with the revolutionary masses, not with the governments, was now to be encouraged, and therefore this new third force was to be formed from below rather than from above.²

An example of this new tactic was Mao's May Day, 1970, Proclamation in which the Japanese government was bracketed as one of the "running dogs of imperialism," while the Japanese people were identified as part of a third force movement which would overthrow all imperialism. As a result of this post-1967 Chinese strategy, Sino-Japanese relations have continued to expand on the informal, unofficial level, but government-to-government relationships have stultified amidst insults hurled by Peking against the Tokyo regime.

UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS

The two nations do not have official diplomatic relations with each other. Several Japanese newsmen work in Peking, and usually four Chinese journalists write from Tokyo. Several thousand Japanese visit China each year, including businessmen and tourists as well as members of pro-Maoist organizations. Each nation maintains a trade mission which has quasi-diplomatic privileges in the other's capital. Through these and other missions, Sino-Japanese trade jumped 13.8 per cent in

1969 to a record \$625 million. Only \$75-million worth in trade occurred under agreements between the two governments. The remaining \$550-million worth of trade was carried on between "friendly firms" which Peking carefully chooses and favors.

Japan enjoys a favorable balance in this trade, exporting more than she imports from China to such an extent that Peking is concerned about restoring the balance. But China needs Japan more than the Japanese need China. The latter accounts for no more than 3 per cent of Japan's total trade, while China obtains from Japan badly needed fertilizer, steel and commodities now short in world supply.

The Chinese ironically contribute to the development of a Japanese economy which not only increasingly outdistances China's, but has surpassed West Germany's to rank second in the Western world behind the United States and third, globally, behind the Soviet Union. At Japan's current annual expansion rate of 11 per cent, the Japanese could overtake the Soviets by the late 1970's. During 1969, Tokyo led the world in trade expansion, growing at a 23.7 per cent rate against a world average of 13.5 per cent.

The political problems of Japan's economic power are compounded for the Chinese—and Japanese—by the increasing appearance of United States corporations working through Japanese trading companies to gain access to the China market. Of the 200 largest firms in the United States, 78 now operate in Japan, despite stringent Japanese discrimination against outside capital. At the Canton Trade Fair in April, 1970, for example, Japanese companies with close ties to such United States corporations as Dow Chemical were in attendance, despite China's determined effort to exclude both Canadian and Japanese firms which had United States ties. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told a Japanese delegation before the Canton Trade Fair opened that Peking would not allow other nationals to front for American companies. As a result, four Japanese firms, including the powerful Mitsubishi combine, were barred from trade with China.³

² An excellent analysis of this Chinese policy transformation is given in David Mozingo, *China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution* (Ithaca, New York: IREA Interim Report 1, 1970).

³ *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1970, p. G3:1-6.

Japanese businessmen are concerned that if the United States erects tariff walls against cheap Japanese products, China will offer the only large alternative market. But they realize that if that market is to be exploited, they might have to race the Americans. The Japanese press has been conscious of the "encirclement" of the mainland by American firms which are waiting to enter the fabled China market, that same phantom market sought by many ancestors of these firms between the 1780's and 1949.

Peking, therefore, is becoming increasingly related economically to a Japan which is commercially as well as politically tied closely to China's arch-enemy, the United States. The Chinese have attempted to rationalize the relationship by vigorously attacking the Japanese government of Premier Eisaku Sato while trading with the "friendly firms," and sharply differentiating between the Japanese people and their government.

Such a distinction between people and government is very questionable. In late December, 1969, Sato's ruling Liberal-Democratic party won a smashing electoral victory, gaining a stronger grip on the Diet (the Japanese Parliament), while the opposition Socialists (many of whom attempted to placate Peking with the cry of "unarmed neutrality" for Japan) lost 50 seats. The Socialists verged on a split which would divide the party into right- and left-wing factions. Sato's Liberal-Democratic party contains its pro-Peking elements, but these are led by the aged Aichihiro Fujiyama, formerly Foreign Minister in 1959-1960, whose policies urging closer economic ties with Peking depended on the granting by the Japanese Export-Import Bank of long-term credits to China for the purchase of Japanese goods.

In February, 1970, Sato ruled out granting such credits. To make his policy clearer, he reiterated his intention of considering China's admission to the United Nations as an "important matter" requiring a two-thirds vote in the United Nations rather than the mere majority vote which would otherwise be needed. Sato's position on the long-term credits issue in early 1970 seemed especially

significant, for in 1968 he had said that the Yoshida Letter (a message written by former Premier Shigeru Yoshida in 1951 to Chiang Kai-shek assuring Chiang that Japan would not grant long-term credits to Peking), was no longer binding on Tokyo. In 1970, Sato therefore moved closer to the anti-Peking, pro-Taiwan faction within the Liberal Democratic party. That faction is led by his elder brother, former Premier Nobusuke Kishi.

Shortly after Sato's statements, the Chinese retaliated by sharply distinguishing between governmental and "friendly firms" trade. In March, 1970, Yoshima Furui, former Japanese Welfare Minister, traveled to Peking to keep alive the small government trade contracts which had initially been negotiated in 1962. After 40 days of strenuous talks, Furui renewed the agreement, but to obtain the pact he had to join the Chinese in a "private level" communiqué which attacked Furui's own government for reviving militarism and carrying out the United States-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960. While Furui and Sato bore these insults, a private Japanese delegation visited Peking and was effusively greeted by Kuo Mo-jo, Honorary President of the Japan-China Friendship Society and a close associate of Chou En-lai. In these discussions with Kuo Mo-Jo and at the Canton Trade Fair, the bases for Sino-Japanese trade were expanded.

FUTURE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

How far Sino-Japanese trade relations can stretch depends in large part upon China's internal political situation. The Japanese were heartened that, as the Cultural Revolution quieted, Chou En-lai apparently gained control of China's diplomatic apparatus. Tokyo believed it could work out a long-term policy with Chou. The Chinese view of such a policy, however, depended not only upon Chou's ascendancy, but also upon four other Japanese policies.

First, China was extremely worried about the reviving Japanese military machine. Chou publicly told both a North Korean audience and a private Japanese delegation that the automatic renewal of the United

States-Japanese Security Treaty in 1970 was an alliance against China and North Korea through which Japan hoped to emerge again as a great military power. When the present 1967-1972 five-year plan for the military is complete, Japan will have a 222,000-man army, as compared with China's 2.5 million and North Korea's 330,000. The Japanese Navy, however, will be up to 142,000 tons, exceeded only by China's 200,000 tons and the Far Eastern elements of the Russian and United States fleets. The Air Force will have 800 aircraft as compared with China's 2,300 and the 2,000 Soviet planes stationed in the Far East. But the Japanese air power will be stronger than that of Taiwan or the Philippines and, by 1972, Japan will have F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers, the most effective United States combat plane. All but 12 of the 106 F-4 Phantoms will be built in Japan. The F-4's as originally designed carried nuclear missiles, but the Japanese models reportedly will be geared to employ only air-to-air missiles.

Japan's next five-year plan (1972-1976) will step up defense spending from 1 per cent of the Gross National Product to 1.2 per cent of a much larger G.N.P. Some Cabinet members have talked of a \$6-billion budget which would amount to about 1.5 per cent of the G.N.P. by 1975; that budget would be larger than the 1970 defense budgets of West Germany, France and Great Britain.⁴

Sato underlined Japan's new military policies with his Cabinet reorganization after his smashing December, 1969, electoral victory. Most interesting was Sato's appointment as head of the Defense Agency of Yashuhiro Nakasone, 51 years old, charismatic, ambitious, outspoken and very popular with the foreign press corps in Tokyo. As a private citizen in 1969, Nakasone had urged that the Japanese defense budget be tripled by 1974 so that the United States-Japanese Security Treaty could be terminated the following year and Japan could become an independent military force. In early March, 1970, after

assuming official responsibilities, Nakasone partially reversed his earlier views and argued against Japan's possession of an independent nuclear capability. He believed the cost would be too high, that a national consensus for the policy did not yet exist, and that in any nuclear exchange a third party without such weapons (like Japan) "might actually profit the most." In line with this policy, Japan signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in February, 1970, but Diet ratification, which is needed for official Japanese adherence to the pact, seems to be in the distant future, particularly since China demonstrated new nuclear capabilities and orbited her first earth satellite in the spring of 1970. Japan has two years to ratify the treaty after having signed it. Meanwhile, her 22 nuclear reactors, which produce energy for peaceful industrial purposes, continue to be closely supervised by the International Atomic Energy Commission.

China interpreted the United States-Japanese agreement on Okinawa in November, 1969, as part of this revived militarism. Okinawa is to revert to Japan in 1972 without the United States nuclear missiles currently installed there. The United States bases, however, are to remain in Okinawa indefinitely, and Washington can reintroduce missiles and use Okinawan bases against third countries after consultation with the Japanese. In late 1969, Sato told the National Press Club in Washington that if the United States wished to use bases in Japan and Okinawa for combat purposes, Japan's policy "toward prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly." He emphasized this position by explicitly calling South Korea and Taiwan (two areas the United States covers from its Japanese and Okinawan bases) "essential" to Japanese security. The November, 1969, Nixon-Sato agreement also permitted the 1960 United States-Japanese security arrangement (which allows United States bases in Japan) to be renewed automatically in June, 1970.

The Chinese reaction to the events of November, 1969, to January, 1970, was predictable: "By rigging up a more reactionary

⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 30, 1970, pp. 115-116; *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 31, 1970, p. 7:1-3.

Cabinet," *Peking Review* wrote on January 30, 1970, Sato "further exposed the ambitions of the reactionary Japanese Government to embark on aggression and expansion abroad by intensifying its collusion with U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism." ("Social-imperialism" is the new Chinese euphemism for Russian policies.)

In early April, Chou suddenly flew to North Korea, in part to reassure the North Koreans, and through them other Asian friends of Peking, that Cambodian and Japanese developments did not mean that China would falter in protecting her friends. It was Chou's first visit to North Korea in 12 years and only his second trip out of China since the Cultural Revolution began. The choice of North Korea for the dramatic trip might have been partially explained by an earlier United States announcement that one of the two American divisions in South Korea would be withdrawn as part of the Nixon Doctrine. United States fire-power in the area would remain intact because of the nuclear weapons ready for use. But the Japanese worried that the announcement presaged a complete United States withdrawal in the not distant future, leaving Japan exposed to a Communist thrust through South Korea.

Tokyo's statements on military policies during early 1970 were doubtless rooted in part in this concern, and those statements in turn worried North Koreans who, together with their former countrymen to the south, had either fought or had been conquered by the Japanese during much of the past 2,000 years. Chou's quick trip therefore served as a warning to the Japanese and as reassurance to his allies.

THE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN

A second factor which stunts Sino-Japanese relations is Taiwan. This problem exemplifies both the commercial and the military relationships outlined above. Chou has called Taiwan the "essence" of outstanding Sino-Japanese problems. In 1951, at the behest of the United States Department of State, Japan signed a treaty of amity with

Taiwan and Taiwan's President Chiang Kai-shek. Tokyo businessmen in the post-1951 period quickly found their way around Chiang's new domicile, which had been a Japanese colony for a half century before World War II. In the fiscal year ending in April, 1969, Japan's trade with Taiwan amounted to over \$700 million; \$517 million of this was accounted for by Japanese exports.

Japan's investments in Taiwan, particularly in transportation and industry, are of even greater political and economic significance. Sato refuses to grant long-term credit to China primarily because of Japanese fear that such credits would lead to a possible trade boycott of Japan's products by Taiwan. Given Chiang's dependence on Japan (a dependence which will grow if the United States follows through on the Nixon Doctrine), the fear of such a boycott is probably unfounded. However, Japan does not have to test this point for the time being. She enjoys enlarged opportunities in both Taiwan and Mainland China, contrary to political logic.

A third Sino-Japanese problem is Peking's fear that Japan is becoming a paramount and anti-Chinese power in Southeast Asia. Japan is Indonesia's number one trading partner; she dominates Thailand's transportation, textile, and iron and steel industries; and is a leading economic power in such key areas as Malaya, Burma and even Australia. The Japanese fully realize that if any military power is flashed in support of this economic expansion, it will arouse memories of the hated Japanese occupation and Co-Prosperity Sphere in Southeast Asia during the 1930's. The Chinese constantly play on such

(Continued on page 178)

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Discussing China's increasing interest in the Middle East, this observer notes that "the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' have led to "disillusionment with China" on the part of the Arab states.

China in the Arab World

BY JOSEPH D. BEN-DAK

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CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG told a delegation of Arabs in 1965 that "you are the door of our great Asian continent and we are its rear." Since 1954 the Chinese have been trying to find the "keys" to open that door, and their search has been a cause of increasing concern to the Soviet Union.¹

There are basically three levels of diplomatic relations between China and the Arab states. The U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, North and South Yemen, Sudan and Aden afford full diplomatic recognition to China and have consistently voted for her admission into the United Nations. Most of the other Arab states have retained at least a formalistic pro-Western predilection and recognize Taiwan; these countries are Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Morocco and particularly Tunisia have tried to remain

neutral and have argued for the admission of both Chinas into the U.N.

By far the most important and effective Chinese diplomatic office has been in Cairo. Until late 1969 this office directed Chinese efforts in the Persian Gulf as well as in Africa with great skill. Most of the credit for this "grand design" belongs to Huang Hua, a friend of Premier Chou En-lai. Huang Hua was considered so essential that he was the only top Chinese diplomat not recalled during the Cultural Revolution crisis. Huang Hua was a thorn in the side of the Soviets for many years. They eventually succeeded in having him ousted in December, 1969, when the Egyptians asked him to leave. Also notable on the diplomatic front are the two representatives of China in the Yemen and Iraq, who have woven an intricate fine base in the Gulf states in the tradition of Huang Hua himself.

Relations between the U.A.R. and China have been subjected to many changes. Just after the Suez crisis when the British froze Egyptian bank accounts, U.A.R.—Chinese relations were at their height. The Chinese came through with a loan and a grant of \$4.7 million, an offer of volunteers, and strong moral support for the Egyptian position.

Two factors have, however, resulted in a cooling off of friendship since that time. The first is the Egyptian fear of a Communist upheaval, which resulted in the banning of the Communist party of the U.A.R. and the

¹ In part, this article reflects research done in Oslo, Norway, in 1969. The author is indebted to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and to the International Peace Research Institute. For further reference in relatively non-speculative analyses I would recommend: G. Massannat, "Sino-Arab Relations," *Asian Survey*, April, 1966; D. Volsky, "Middle East Schemes of Peking," *New Times*, Moscow, January 22, 1969, (the Russian story); "Die Auswirkungen des Sino-Sowjetischen Konflikts auf die Nahost-Krise," *Orientierung*, No. 247, July, 1969; J. E. Khalili, "Sino-Arab Relations," *Asian Survey*, August, 1968; Khalili, "China and the UAR," *ibid.*, April, 1970; Rafi Yisraeli, "Communist China's Struggle for Presence in Arab States" (Hebrew), *The New East*, Vol. XVIII, 1968, nos. 1-2. Some of the observations made in this article have especially benefited from this discussion.

imprisonment of party leaders, and Egypt's support of other Arab states' anti-Communist measures. Recently the Chinese were blamed for the student demonstrations in Alexandria and Aswan and charged with supporting the rebels with money and printing facilities. While these complaints were made privately to Huang Hua, some members of the Chinese Embassy were declared *persona non grata*. In Tunisia, however, the entire embassy staff was ordered out of the country.

Secondly, the Soviets have been bringing influence to bear upon the Arabs to take a more anti-Chinese line. This has caused relations between the U.A.R. and China to become even more strained. The Soviets were concerned about the amount of scientific and technological cooperation between the Egyptians and the Chinese. An alleged agreement gave Egyptian scientists the right to inspect Chinese nuclear installations, a concession remarkable because no other nation had ever previously been given that privilege.²

Since then the Soviets have been promoting discord between the U.A.R. and the Chinese. For example, a Chinese student was granted asylum in the Soviet embassy in Cairo in February, 1968, despite Chinese protests. The U.A.R. was caught in the middle, with President Gamal Abdel Nasser explaining many times that there had been "misunderstandings" with the Chinese, while the Chinese accused Nasser of "coddling" the Russians.

Nasser has been extremely cautious in establishing a defined relationship with the Chinese, as is evidenced by the fact that many Sino-Egyptian agreements have never been implemented; for example, the December, 1964, agreement whereby China was to give the U.A.R. an interest-free loan of 345 million Swiss francs. By April, 1968, only 12 per cent of the money had been drawn. The Russians and Eastern European states have paid for most of the projects which the loan was to have financed.

The trade volume between the U.A.R. and China is about \$85 million per annum. Re-

ports indicate that China imports raw cotton, rice, and industrial commodities from the U.A.R., while the U.A.R. imports wheat at times, tea, coffee, canned meat, fish, paper, timber and crude machinery. The fact that China normally exports rice and imports wheat shows that she has tried to be as accommodating as possible to the needs of Egypt.³ However, it now seems that for the time being China has little to hope for from the U.A.R.

SYRIA AND IRAQ

The Chinese experiences with Syria and Iraq have been very similar to those with the U.A.R. Successful diplomatic efforts were initiated in Syria in 1956 and in Iraq in 1958; trade, youth, and cultural exchanges were begun following Chinese initiatives and at the rate of approximately two Chinese undertakings to every Arab one. This was topped by the Muslim campaign in the late 1950's. However, the relations of China with the indigenous Communists in Syria and Iraq are intriguing. When the 1958 laws against Syrian Communists were implemented, China reacted by exhibiting a speech by Khaled Bakdash, an *exiled* Syrian Communist party leader, attacking repression at the much publicized "decade festival" in Peking.

China's failure in the Communist parties of the Arab states had become evident by 1967. In February, the Syrians passed a resolution supporting the Moscow line against the Peking line. In May, 1967, a meeting of Arab Communists stated:

Mao Tse-Tung's emissaries and hirelings carry on their subversive policy in the Arab world and this policy links up with imperialist policies in the Arab countries.

The Mao group is making feverish attempts to poison the relationships of friendship, cooperation, and solidarity between the new Arab states and the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, to undermine the relations of the Arab countries themselves. It concentrates on combating the Communist Parties of the Arab countries as it continues its fruitless attempts to split their ranks. It tries to foil efforts towards cooperation between the revolutionary and the progressive forces throughout the Arab world and in each particular Arab country, and makes futile attempts to strengthen adventurist trends

² Rous Al-Yussuf, April 19, 1965.

³ E.g.: *China Trade Newsletter*, London, June, 1969; compare to *At-Taliah*, August 21, 1955.

in the Middle East, playing by its activities into the hands of the imperialists and of Israel.

In May, 1969, a Syrian mission led by Moustafa Tlas, the chief of staff of the Syrian armed forces, arrived in Peking.⁴ The delegation met with the Premier and top Chinese officials such as Chief of Staff Haung Yung Sheng and was shown machinery plants and naval bases. United Press International reported that Eastern European diplomats were of the belief that the Syrians were involved in purchasing surface-to-surface missiles. The *Observer* (London) and the Italian news agency ANSA suggested at the time that 400 Chinese technicians were to begin work on missile sites within weeks.

The delegation was the first Syrian one to visit Peking since the 1966 coup that brought President and Premier Nureddin al-Attassi's government to power. At a reception in Peking, Tlas was not explicitly anti-Soviet, but he made statements on "Social Imperialism" as he was about to conclude his visit. Moscow's Chinese broadcast said that China's suggestion to Tlas that armed struggle should be resumed in the Middle East was a "brusque provocation."

It is difficult to determine the effect of the Sino-Syrian courtship of 1969. The Baath party has not made its final choice between China and the U.S.S.R. The national emotions are quite frequently pro-Chinese, although the party leadership is not swayed by these emotions.⁵ Decisions were made by the Baath Party Congress in the month before the Peking visit to strengthen ties with the Soviets, and news of later visits to Moscow by high-ranking Syrian officials was released by the Middle East News Agency on May 25, 1969.

The Communist party of Iraq, considered to be one of the strongest in the Arab world, has long been split over the question of loyalty

to the Soviet Union or to China. Aziz Al-Hajj, China's number one man in Iraq, was arrested in early 1969. He had been working closely with ex-President Abdul Rahman Arif and the ex-Prime Minister, Tahir Yahya. The emphatic "pledge of loyalty" to Moscow by the new Baghdad regime resulted in a setback for the Chinese schemes of establishing a Communist regime in Iraq "by armed force."

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the focal points of China's efforts today. Although Israel was one of the first countries to recognize China, and the first Middle Eastern country to do so (1950), diplomatic relations were never really established between the two nations. In spite of an Israeli trade mission led by David Ha'Cohen in 1955 and many more efforts to establish relations mediated through Burma, China gave strong support to the Arab position. In fact, China picked on the Soviet Union's policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict to malign the Soviet Union to Arabs and sections of the "Third World."

China emerges as the patron of the Palestinian guerrilla groups. George Habash, one of the guerrilla leaders, put their feelings succinctly: "our best friend, in fact, is China. China wants Israel erased from the map because as long as Israel exists, there will remain an aggressive imperialist outpost on Arab soil."⁶ China indicated this in March, 1965, when the Arab commando leader, Ahmed Shukairy, first began to visit China frequently, and then established an office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in China. Trained P.L.O. members came back from China in August of that year. When Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah (Arab commando group) merged with the P.L.O., the two established a permanent delegation in Peking.

As far as supplying arms, China gave little help. She sent the Palestinians light arms, many of which were Soviet built and had been overused by the Chinese Army. These arms reached the Palestinians through Syria and Pakistan. The emotional impact of the Chinese offer of help led to a feeling of great

⁴ New China News Agency, May 13, 1969-May 25, 1969.

⁵ See, for instance, *Al-Baath* (Damascus), November 11, 1965.

⁶ For the elaboration of this feeling most accessible to the American reader, see O. Fallacis, articles in *Life*, June 12, 1970, and in *Look*, June 12, 1970.

expectation by the Palestinians. Yet, in fact, few Palestinians have received much military training from China, nor did the Palestinians apply Mao's principles to their warfare with any success.⁷

Consequently, China's appeal to most Palestinians is more a matter of her unconditional support, rather than her material aid. China's small successes with the Arab governments made it easy to give the Arab guerrillas such as Arafat the honor of official visits to China. The Russians are unable to do this because of their deep involvement with the governments that often as not the guerrillas despise.⁸

THE PERSIAN GULF

The Sino-Soviet struggle in the Middle East gives indications that the next focal point will lie further to the south in the Arabian Peninsula. Last year the Italian news agency OP reported that China had allocated "millions of dollars" for work in this area in the hope of establishing "a beachhead to control the entrance to the Red Sea and to establish new strong points on this communication line which would play an important part in the event . . . that the blockade of the Suez Canal is lifted."

China has tried assiduously to foment opposition to the existing governments in the Gulf area. Drawing upon the radical sentiment of its largely migrant labor force (many of whom are Palestinians), China has succeeded in organizing guerrillas.⁹

China has trained leaders of a Marxist-Maoist liberation front seeking to "liberate" the province of Dhufar from the British Pro-

tectorate of Muscat and Oman. An outgrowth of this organization is the National Front of the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (N.F.L.O.A.G.). This seemingly ambitious group is based in Aden, another area under growing Chinese influence.

China has also enthusiastically aided other Maoist factions in the area. Hadharmawt, for example, has quite an influential pro-Chinese group that shares the belief that all vestiges of British influence should be removed; what this really means is the "elimination" of the oil monopolies.

Interestingly both China and the U.S.S.R. have delayed implementing the extensive loan and aid programs which they promised to the Southern Yemen. The 1968-1969 arms and development capital promised by the U.S.S.R. has never materialized, nor has it been matched by China. For the time being, each party guardedly watches the other. At this stage, the Persian Gulf reflects the competition syndrome between the Russians and the Chinese.

CHINA AND ARAB OIL

As early as 1953, the yield of crude oil within China was estimated at 20 million barrels per annum, while reserves are considered virtually unlimited. The need to utilize this potential was intensified by the Great Leap Forward in industry (1957-1962) and by China's immodestly high quotas on her own steel production. Also, as a result of the Sino-Soviet rift, China must annually secure an additional three million tons of oil from non-Soviet sources.¹⁰

Thus China's interest in the Arab world's oil in 1963-1964 was as natural as her interest in the oil of Rumania and Hungary. A significant investigation was undertaken by Premier Chou En-lai on his "African Safari," and he was followed by delegations of Chinese oil experts wishing to secure four million tons of oil per annum.

Because of the low level of oil exports to China, her strategy has been modified. She now focuses on the development of her own oil industry and almost all oil news emanating

⁷ This is the case not only in the Middle East. See A. J. Klinghoffer, "Mao or Che? Some Reflections on Communist Guerrilla Warfare," *Mizan*, March-April, 1969. *Al Hadeth*, (Beirut), has published excellent reviews of this matter.

⁸ See, for instance, *An-Nahar* (Beirut), March 5, 1970.

⁹ In this analysis I am indebted to the assistance of D. M. McClintock ("Southwestern Arabia") and R. G. Landen ("The Gulf States") in A. Al-Marayati (ed.), *Contemporary Middle East Governments and Politics* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing House, forthcoming).

¹⁰ I am indebted to the research into China's oil resources and economy by J. S. Prybyla of Pennsylvania State University.

from China stresses the progress being made in this direction.

The fact that many of the items that China needs for development of her oil industry cannot be purchased in the Middle East (e.g., remote control particles, high and medium pressure valves) has led to a reduction in the number of oil-gear contracts in the region. Finally, in order to avoid unfavorable competition with the Russians and to have the upper hand in future oil arrangements, China's focus on the Persian Gulf area has been substantially increased.

SINO-ARAB TRADE

With the sole exception of Saudi Arabia which banned trade with China in 1968, no Middle Eastern state has refused to trade with China. In fact, in terms of China's share of the market, which increased from almost nothing to \$120 million yearly in the seven years up to 1969, the relative share of the market controlled by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites has decreased.¹¹ Two patterns are now beginning to emerge: one in which China is seen to overtake the Soviet Union in exports, for example, to Lebanon, and the other in which the Russian share of the market is growing faster than the Chinese, as in the U.A.R., Syria and Iran.

China's relations with the Sudan and Libya are illustrative of China's progress. The Sudan receives Chinese exports at a steadier rate than it receives Soviet exports. In fact, China tripled its exports to the Sudan between 1963 and 1968, but the rate of growth declined somewhat after a massive effort to match China was made by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U.S.S.R. In Libya, China has moved from the position of the least important exporter to that of the most important exporter in the five years from 1963 to 1968; China exported over twice as much

to Libya in 1966 as Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union combined.

Typical of China's explicit need for Middle Eastern products, as well as her fluctuating consumption demands, is cotton. For instance, when China is damaged by drought in some major cotton producing areas (as she was in 1968–1969); the prospect of importing the necessary cotton from Arab countries becomes particularly attractive. The U.A.R. has traditionally been only too happy to divert her surplus cotton to China. In fact, this was a matter under consideration in Nasser's talks with the Chinese delegation at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

China's consumption outlook is usually based today on the importation of some cotton, but the tendency is to cut down on the imports as much as possible. In 1965–1966 Syria sent 23 per cent of her crude cotton to China but the following year the proportion was down to 16 per cent. Soviet demand was more stable, however, at approximately 17 per cent in both years.¹² Table I incorporates some further relevant figures on this topic.

TABLE I: Cotton Exports 1967–1968
(in thousands of bales)

From	Sudan	Syria	Turkey	UAR
To China	50	46	7	40
To U.S.S.R.	71	71	11	163

Source: *Cotton*, August, 1968.

AID STRATEGIES

Since 1956 the Chinese have offered more than \$850 million in aid to the Middle Eastern countries. The amount of actual assistance given has totalled only about \$300 million. Moscow and her satellites, however, have offered upwards of \$5 billion with a negligible discrepancy between their pledges and their follow-ups. These facts have several implications.

First of all, they indicate China's disillusionment with economic aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Secondly they indicate the Arab states' disillusionment with China, due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Arab states did not find China to be a highly desirable source of aid,

¹¹ See, for instance, *China Trade Report*, January, 1969; *China Trade Newsletter*, January, 1969; *Middle East Economic Development*, January, 1969, and February, 1970. For earlier developments, see D. Barnett, *Communist Economic Strategy* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959).

¹² *L'Economie et les Finances de la Syne et des Pays Arabes*, Damascus, March, 1967.

especially while her enemies were more than willing to supply the Arabs with the needed goods and capital.

An understanding of China's aid policy towards the Middle East must take into consideration the element of surprise and the Arab psychology in times of crisis. Thus the 1950's saw China exporting tons of her badly needed steel, and diverting Eastern European imports to the U.A.R. Similarly, in June, 1967, China sent large amounts of wheat which she had purchased from Australia, and a \$10-million cash donation "to help Egypt resist American imperialist aggression."

A typical Chinese aid program focuses on a country of strategic interest, such as the Yemen. A comparison of the 1958 and the 1964 agreements demonstrates the lessening of financial emphasis. In 1958 the Yemen was to export agricultural and mineral products and in return receive a \$16.4-million loan. In 1964 financial assistance was negligible. The crux of the agreement lay in training and construction.

CULTURAL STRATEGIES

The single most important event serving as a bridge between China and the Arab world was the Bandung Conference of 1955. Burhan Shahadi, a Chinese Muslim member of the Chinese Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, not only participated in the Bandung Conference, but he also enhanced the Chinese Muslim strategy by doing the following: 1) inviting Hassan el-Bakuri and other Egyptian ministers of religious affairs to Peking to sign a cultural agreement; 2) starting a well-publicized Cairo stopover for Chinese pilgrims on their way to Mecca; 3) opening a Sino-Islamic institute in Peking to further the Islamic and Arabic learning "already taking place in 40,000 mosques in the country"; 4) announcing the Chinese Muslim interest in studying at Al-Azhar, the renowned university in Cairo, and allocating

government money to allow the "Chinese to study Islam abroad."

It was at Bandung that China put to use one of her lesser known resources: her Muslim population. Although the number of Muslims in China is estimated at 10 million, she set the figure at 50 million. The majority of the Muslims in China live in conditions of poverty. During the Cultural Revolution persecution began anew and mosques were destroyed. The anti-religious philosophy of Mao's China, and the Muslims' vulnerable position as a minority who had refused assimilation had not gone unnoticed in the Arab press.¹³ The Chinese decided to use the Muslims in China to gain a foothold in the Middle East. Publications about the Islamic region in China and "free religious activity" began to pour out.

The Chinese have also been resourceful in the use of media to further their contacts with the Arab world. Arabic versions of *Peking Review*, *China Pictorial*, *China Reconstructs* and many other specially produced magazines and reports have been reaching wide audiences in the Arab world. The New China News Agency assiduously covers any item that could possibly benefit China's relations with the Arab nations.

From 1956 onwards, major Arab periodicals have referred to Mao's abundant (and naturally rather cheap) writings. Visits to the Arab states by Chinese artists, teachers, students, journalists and film makers are made whenever possible to reinforce China's intellectual appeal. China has won further sympathy by encouraging similar efforts from the Arab world. The Chinese often acknowledge Arab culture by publishing works ranging

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¹³ The Muslim situation has been pertinently elucidated in Geoffrey Wheeler's research, see his: "Russia and China in Central Asia," *The World Today*, March, 1970.

"... as long as the war in Southeast Asia expands, especially when China's nuclear establishment is also growing, the tension between China and the United States will inexorably tend to increase to the peril point..."

China and the United States: Collision Course?

BY O. EDMUND CLUBB
U.S. Foreign Service Officer (Retired)

FROM THE MOMENT the Communist regime was set up at Peking in 1949, Chairman Mao Tse-tung aimed at transforming China into a world power. He viewed the United States from the beginning as a major obstacle to the fulfillment of his design, and duly labelled it "imperialist" and hence enemy. In time, China's one major ally, the Soviet Union, acted as an Asian power to obstruct instead of to further some of Peking's designs, and it was also put in the category of enemy—as a heretical "modern revisionist."

At the Ninth Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) Congress in April, 1969, Defense Minister Lin Piao spoke out boldly, as if the world situation were changing only to China's advantage. Despite a smashing Soviet defeat of Chinese forces in a recent border clash, and seemingly fearless of American purposes in Asia, Lin virtually welcomed the hostility of both the Soviet Union and the United States, declaring, "this is China's honor."¹

Holding that "A new historical period of opposing United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun," he issued, doubtless on Mao's behalf, a clarion call:

Workers of all countries unite! Proletarians and oppressed people and nations of the world, unite!

¹ "Lin Piao's Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, April 30, 1969, pp. 16-35 (p. 34).

² From text in *Current History*, September, 1969, pp. 176-180 *passim*.

Bury U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and their lackeys!

Lin quoted Mao: "The enemy rots with every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily." And the congress wrote into the new party constitution the avowed determination of the C.C.P. "to overthrow imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism headed by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, and reactionaries of all countries, in order to build a new world free from imperialism, capitalism, and systems of exploitation."² That statement incorporated both Mao Tse-tung's major antagonisms, and his messianism.

The pretense of power had little relation to objective reality. At home, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (G.P.C.R.) had divided Communist leadership as never before, and set back the economy. Abroad, China's foreign relations, wracked by two full years of Mao's revolutionism, were in a shambles. The country's prestige was at its nadir in Asian, African and Western nations. In the foreign field, moreover, the nation faced not fresh promise but new threats of danger. Both "revisionist" Soviet Russia and "imperialist" United States presented China with new challenges. A rehabilitation and reorientation of China's foreign policy were urgently demanded.

The resurrection of China's diplomatic relations was not accomplished quickly, but it

came. There were straws that early showed a favorable wind. Italian Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni had announced on January 24, 1969, that his government had decided to recognize Peking. President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, in a message sent to the Congress a few days later, stated that there existed "the urgent need to strive toward a *modus vivendi*" with China.³ And Canada in February, 1969, made a *démarche* aimed at opening talks with Peking regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States, when apprised of this fact, on February 11, let it be known that it had informed Ottawa of American concern "over the possible implications of such a move for the government of Nationalist China. . . ."⁴ Peking nevertheless responded favorably, and after some delay the negotiations began in Stockholm. They soon stalled on the Chinese insistence that recognition by Canada include Ottawa's endorsement of Peking's claim to Formosa.

With the ninth party congress out of the way, Peking turned to some of the routine details of diplomatic housekeeping. Early in the G.P.C.R., all but one of the heads of 47 Chinese foreign missions—Ambassador Huang Hua at Cairo — had been recalled to China; and Huang himself returned home in July, 1969. From May to July, however, China despatched 17 ambassadors to the field, mostly to Asian and African posts, but also to France, Sweden, Rumania and Albania. The first ambassador to take up his post, Keng Piao, logically went to Albania; but soon afterwards Huang Chen went to occupy the ambassadorial post at Paris, for France, like Canada, sells wheat to China. It was moreover not without diplomatic significance that, in August, Peking at long last granted an exit visa to British Chargé d'Affaires Donald Hopson; and other members of the official British family were permitted to leave China.

³ *Facts on File*, 1969, p. 75.

⁴ *Facts on File*, 1968, p. 101.

* *Editor's note*: In 1955, 29 African and Asian states met at Bandung and adopted five "principles of peaceful coexistence," formulated by Communist China.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The Sino-American relationship, not unnaturally, was much slower to show signs of life. The overall American political situation in 1968 had borne a somewhat promising aspect for China. In response to growing anti-war sentiment in the United States, there had been first the de-escalation of the war in Vietnam and then the complete stoppage of the bombing of North Vietnam. Republican Richard M. Nixon, pledged to remove the United States from its latest Asian war, was elected President. There seemed promise that peace was going to descend on China's southeastern periphery. That potential indicated that, after 20 years, a relaxation of Sino-American tensions might at last be achieved. For the critical area of the Sino-American relationship is found on the east and southeastern periphery of China, where United States and Chinese forces meet.

The United States had actually proposed on November 1, 1968, that a new meeting of the United States and Chinese ambassadors should be held at Warsaw; and on November 20, *after* the elections were over, Peking suggested February 20, 1969, as the meeting date, taking the occasion of its reply to call upon the United States to withdraw its military forces from Formosa and the Formosa Strait and to enter upon an agreement for observance of the Five (Bandung) Principles of peaceful coexistence.* On February 8, 1969, two days before the scheduled meeting, Peking abruptly cancelled the engagement, giving as the reason the recent grant of hospitality by the United States to the diplomatic defector Liao Ho-shu, a minor functionary of the Chinese embassy in the Netherlands. In January, however, there had been President Nixon's statement that United States policy toward China would not change until China herself had changed; and this had been followed by Washington's remonstrance to Canada against the undertaking of negotiations looking toward the recognition of Peking. It may be surmised that, apart from the nominal reason given for the cancellation of the meeting, Peking saw little promise of profit to China in Washington's attitude.

Nor did President Nixon's enunciation of the "Guam Doctrine" in the summer of 1969 offer more to Peking. The United States, President Nixon indicated, proposed to reduce its military involvements in Asia, while still watching Asian developments and honoring its treaty commitments. The President clearly portrayed an American determination to remain in Asia, in fulfillment of the role of a "Pacific power." That was a purpose to which Peking was unalterably opposed.

Few countries sent delegates to the October, 1969, celebration of the establishment of Communist power in Peking.⁵ The only European countries represented were Albania and Rumania. That circumstance was a mark of China's isolation from the world community. Premier Chou En-lai, while describing the international situation as "excellent," warned that it was necessary to prepare against the war threats of "U.S. imperialism and social imperialism," and proclaimed that the Chinese people would "carry the struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction through to the end."⁶ However, one of the slogans issued for the occasion suggested that China looked for some aid in carrying out the task:

Unite, peoples of all countries, and oppose any war of aggression launched by imperialism and social imperialism, especially one in which nuclear weapons are used. If such a war breaks out, the peoples of the world should use revolutionary war to eliminate the war of aggression, and preparations should be made right now!⁷

Significantly, the emphasis had changed since Lin Piao had spoken in April, 1969: the summons was no longer directed only to the proletariat and the oppressed. This marked a shift from the pure Maoist revolutionism to the concept of a united front.

It had now become evident that, whereas for a decade China had deigned to interest herself in the whole world, and during the

G.P.C.R. had even evinced an intent to remake it, her chief concern had again become Asia, where a hypothetical "war of aggression" threatened. For European countries, and for Canada too, Peking's new pre-occupation signified its return to distinctly more agreeable and more "diplomatic" (in the conventional sense of the word) procedures than had been evident in China's relations with the outside world since the beginning of the G.P.C.R. era. The shift was necessary in order that, if the rumored international holocaust occurred, China would not be found (as she was at the end of the G.P.-C.R.), without potential support anywhere in the world.

EVIDENCE OF MODERATION

That moderation was the new order of the day was confirmed when, on October 20, 1969, Sino-Soviet talks on the tense border situation began in Peking. In October, also, some of the British, German and Japanese nationals arrested in China during the G.P.C.R. were released from prison and allowed to depart. It was only a sign of the times when, in November, it was announced in Belgrade that China had agreed in principle with Yugoslavia—long anathematized by Peking as the "modern revisionist" par excellence—to exchange ambassadors once more, after more than a decade without representation of that rank. Yugoslavia appointed her ambassador in April, 1970, but China held off.

There had been suggestions during the spring and summer of 1969 (and Moscow had implied that it feared such a contingency) that the United States might endeavor to manipulate the Sino-Soviet quarrel to its advantage—perhaps by seeking a rapprochement with the Chinese. The United States went to some pains to deny that it had any such intent. And indeed its actions gave no support to the charge that it might be striving for closer collaboration with either Moscow or Peking with respect to the prime issues of the Asian power balance. In late November, 1969, on a visit to Washington, Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato and President Nixon issued a joint communiqué in which the Presi-

⁵ For a listing, see the account "Warmly Welcoming Foreign Delegations Attending Celebrations of 20th Anniversary of Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review*, October 3, 1969, pp. 24-30.

⁶ *Peking Review*, October 3, 1969, pp. 17-18.

⁷ *Peking Informers*, October 1, 1969, p. 10.

dent gave assurances that the United States "would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East," and the Japanese Premier expressed his general accord with the President's intent.⁸

Peking had regularly been charging United States-Soviet "collusion" for a hostile "encirclement" of China, but was now confronted with a situation in which the United States was moving closer, not to the Soviet Union, but to Japan. Given Japan's growing economic and military power, the Chinese leadership had to take note that a third potential enemy now made up a part of the alleged "encirclement."⁹

A joint 1970 New Year's editorial of the *People's Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* nevertheless ritualistically excoriated both "United States imperialism" and "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique." The editorial radiated defiance: "The great socialist China towers like a giant in the East"; "The raging flames of revolution have already engulfed the 'heartlands' of capitalism"; and, "the 1970's will be years in which the storms of the people's revolution will rise still more vigorously throughout the world. . . . United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism can never escape their doom no matter how they collude with each other. . . . They will not last long."¹⁰

The divergence of antithetical United States and Chinese strategic purposes suddenly became acute in the spring of 1970. In the months after November, 1969, the Guam

Doctrine had gradually taken on harder lines, and it had become evident that the Nixon administration's plan for "Vietnamization" of the war envisaged a continuation of the struggle for victory by altered means, with retention of substantial United States forces in Southeast Asia for an indefinite period. The President's "State of the World" message to Congress of February, 1970, confirmed that reading of the American purpose. The administration's intent was highlighted by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's February 20 report on the progress of China's medium-range ballistic missile (M.R.B.M.) flight test program over the past half decade,¹¹ and his estimates of future possibilities which made it appear probable that United States military positions on the periphery of China would come under the threat of Chinese missiles by the mid-1970's.

United States military actions in Laos earlier in 1969 had mirrored an intent to alter even a "neutralized" situation in Southeast Asia to the United States' advantage. Looking ahead, it could be foreseen that even a partial implementation of London's plan to withdraw British military establishments from Asia "East of Suez" by 1971 would give rise to a United States urge to fill any new "power vacuum" with its own presence. Peking viewed the overthrow of "neutralist" Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia by a rightist coup in March, 1970, in the light of current threatening developments and future prospects.

CHANGING POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is an area of prime historical and strategic significance to China. In the long policy debate of 1965-1966 in Peking, the Maoist faction had demanded that the struggle against "United States imperialism" be given a lower strategic priority than that against "Soviet revisionism"; and, in the words of one observer, "It was the Mao-Lin group, too, that rejected out of hand all proposals for additional Chinese commitments in Vietnam. . . ."¹²

The Maoist group was presumably assured in its own mind that the United States would

⁸ *The New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1969.

⁹ For an account of Peking's reaction to the Nixon-Sato communiqué, see *Le Monde*, December 3, 1969.

¹⁰ "Usher in the Great 1970's," in *Peking Review*, January 2, 1970, pp. 5-7. See in this connection L. F. Goodstadt, "Storms in Store," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 8, 1970, pp. 5-6.

¹¹ See Charles H. Murphy, "China's Place in the Nuclear Stakes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 16, 1970, p. 18.

¹² Uri Ra'anani, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-1966," in Tang Tsou (ed.), *China in Crisis*, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol. 2. *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, pp. 23-71, esp. pp. 66-67. See also Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," *ibid.*, pp. 237-68.

limit its military action in Vietnam, and, even at that, would not invade North Vietnam with ground forces.¹³ However, any threat of a widening war in that region would almost automatically cause Peking to shift its strategic priorities to meet the changed situation.

It was only natural, therefore, that the Chinese involvement in the Southeast Asian embroglio took on a more direct form in the wake of United States intervention in Laos and the political upset in Cambodia. On April 24–25, 1970, at an undisclosed site in China near the Indochina border, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prince Souphanouvong as chief of the Pathet Lao, and prominent Vietnamese representatives from both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front met and agreed to form a united front “against United States aggression and for national salvation.”¹⁴

China played host to the conference, with Premier Chou En-lai himself giving a banquet for the delegates and stating, in a speech on that occasion, that:

The three fraternal Indochinese people [sic] can rest assured that in the common struggle against U.S. imperialism the Chinese people will forever unite with them and fight shoulder to shoulder with them and win victory together.¹⁵

Then, on April 28, the Peking government issued an official declaration on the matter of the Indochinese summit conference in which Mao Tse-tung was quoted as saying that “American imperialism is our common enemy and we must unite and mutually sustain each other.”¹⁶ The declaration went on to say that, in conformity with Mao’s directive, “the Chinese people accords its *total support* to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia in their struggle against the American aggression, and considers that support as *its international duty*” (emphasis supplied). Finally, the Peking statement declared that “The war waged by the three peoples of Indochina . . . is *entirely just*” (emphasis supplied). The wording was obviously calculated to lend the greatest possible weight to the declaration. For a “just war,” in Maoist thinking, is one which must be fought.

As if in answer to the Chinese challenge, on April 30 the joint United States-South Vietnamese drive was launched into Cambodia. With that action, the war in the Indochina peninsula was dramatically and drastically escalated.

The Cambodian development confronted Mao Tse-tung, in his dual capacity of orthodox “Marxist-Leninist” revolutionary and professed strategist of the first order, with a fundamental issue. Should China, which had asserted her claim to leadership of the world revolution, accept the tipping of the scales against the revolutionary forces of Southeast Asia by United States military action which indicated the possible extension of United States control (if indirect) in the direction of the Chinese border itself?

According to United States Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, speaking shortly after the drive into Cambodia was launched, the administration had taken into consideration the possibility of Chinese intervention, but had concluded that such a contingency was remote enough to constitute an “acceptable risk.”¹⁷

The Chinese response, however, had already been foreshadowed by the de-escalation of armed conflict along the Sino-Soviet border beginning in October, 1969. The Chinese and United States ambassadors to Poland were to have held their third meeting of the year at Warsaw on May 20, but on May 18 Peking abruptly cancelled the engagement. On May 20, instead, Chairman Mao came forward to condemn “United States imperialism and its lackeys” for the action in Indochina, and called again on the people of the world to “unite and defeat the United States aggressors and all their running dogs!”¹⁸

¹³ For a revealing treatment by a well-informed diplomatist of the Vietnam War as an issue in the Sino-American negotiations at Warsaw, see Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 268–75.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, April 29, 1970.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, May 1, 1970.

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, April 30, 1970.

¹⁷ For the text of this statement see p. 173 of this issue.

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, “People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!” *Peking Review*, May 23, 1970.

This time, Mao's exhortation, highly personalized, made no reference whatsoever to "social imperialism." He had evidently finally reversed his position of 1965-1966, and had concluded that the conflict with "United States imperialism" demanded precedence over a struggle against simple "modern revisionism." All signs indicated that China was now prepared to make herself into a "rear area" for the revolutionary fighters in the Indochina theater, and to engage her strength more directly in support of a "protracted war" against a United States that had determined to stay in Asia. Years earlier, Peking had proclaimed its readiness to send fighting men to Vietnam, as well as material aid, if needed; now again, by report, the Chinese commitment to full support of the Indochinese peoples included an expression of readiness to despatch "volunteers," if requested.¹⁹

A WIDER WAR?

But early in the war in Vietnam, with the Korean experience in mind, Washington had let it be known that, this time, there would be no "privileged sanctuaries." The meaning of that assertion was clear enough: China, if she were to engage in direct military support of the Vietnamese, would be struck by United States air power. And since it can hardly be assumed that the United States (which has been unable to impose its will upon either North or South Vietnam through the use of half a million men and massive air power) will be able to win a bigger war with half as many men in a "support" role, it is possible that the Nixon administration might soon feel compelled to extend its attacks to new "sanctuaries," and perhaps even to employ

nuclear weapons against China—as was threatened during the latter days of the Korean War,²⁰ when Richard Nixon was Vice President.

In Europe, there has been a laborious but perceptible advance toward peace; in the Middle East, there is crisis, but some will to resolve outstanding issues; in Asia, however, the trend is patently toward a wider and bigger war. For as long as the war in South-east Asia expands, especially when China's nuclear establishment is also growing, the tension between China and the United States will inexorably tend to increase to the peril point—also in the Korean pattern.

The peace of Asia now depends in good measure upon restraints that might be introduced into the hostile Sino-American relationship by third forces, and thus upon what happens in Peking's relations with the rest of the world. In this respect, the portents are modestly favorable for China, for Peking's new policy of moderation promises to bear fruits. It is by no means certain that the impasse over Peking's demand that Ottawa verify China's claim to Formosa will continue; in fact, it was already reported in April, 1970, that there was reason to anticipate a satisfactory formula.²¹ One is assured that this will be the case, if China finally judges it politically profitable to acquire the Canadian recognition.

A successful conclusion of the Sino-Canadian negotiations might easily lead to other developments in the field of international relations, and turn the tide in favor of Peking on the issue of membership in the U.N. Last year, the move to seat Peking's representatives

(Continued on page 179)

¹⁹ Harrison E. Salisbury, *The New York Times*, May 26, 1970; see also Tillman Durdin, "Peking Seeks Gains in Troubled Indochina," *ibid.*, June 14, 1970.

²⁰ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 152; *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1968 ed.), Vol. VI, essay by Walter Millis, "Cold War," pp. 43-44f, esp. p. 44c; Arthur Huck, *The Security of China, Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 64.

²¹ *The New York Times*, April 19, 1970.

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"China remains profoundly torn by her own restless people and her bickering leaders. . . . and the wounds inflicted on the economy [by the Cultural Revolution] are only very gradually being resolved and healed."

China's Economy: Experiments in Maoism

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IT IS PROBABLY true, although no one can be sure, that the Cultural Revolution—the great near-anarchy, purge, and tearing down of structures—came to an uneasy halt sometime toward the end of 1968 or in early 1969. Since the April, 1969, Ninth National Party Congress, emphasis has been placed on the consolidation of the three-way alliances (revolutionary committees) which issued from the cultural turmoil, and on party rebuilding.

This new period of restructuring has not been without its share of what the Chinese press and radio call "petty-bourgeois factionalism" and "counterrevolutionary anarchism" on the part of the masses which, translated, mean murder, street fighting, arson and corruption. On the whole, however, 1969 and the better part of 1970 have been times of relative calm: a period of transition and uncertainty, dominated by the ubiquitous presence of the People's Liberation Army.

The dearth of quantitative data about the economy has continued, with one new labor-saving twist: in agriculture, output is now said to increase regularly by 10 per cent, no matter what, when, or where. Ten per cent seems to be a round sort of figure; it is safe, and it eliminates the need for explanation. Fifty per cent appears to be the favorite figure with which to describe increases of industrial output—give or take one or two per cent for the sake of variety. Whether this kind of economic intelligence is better than the dead silence on the great

issues of the economy which marked the Ninth Party Congress remains a moot question. But all is not lost. While it is indeed difficult to piece together meaningful information about what is actually and exactly happening to the economy, it is relatively easy to understand what the present leaders want the economy to look like in (as they put it) a "not too distant future." As of now and until further notice these men command the gun, and the gun keeps the factions apart, the masses in line, and the wheels of the economy turning by 10 or 50 per cent, as the case may be. Thus it is not unreasonable to assume that some parts of the Maoist vision are, in fact, being implemented.

The implementation of the grand design for a new socialist society is certainly much less smooth than the press and radio indicate. China remains profoundly torn by her own restless people and her bickering leaders. The social and political stalemate created by the Cultural Revolution and the wounds inflicted on the economy are only very gradually being resolved and healed. There is no guarantee that the process of reconstruction will continue unhampered or that it will not be interrupted by new flying leaps of consciousness and illusory great leaps forward in production. But for the moment, at least, the general outlines of the new society are being traced.

The Maoist conception of the future Communist society, a blend of Fourierist Utopia and hard-headed, totalitarian-tempered prag-

matism, is clearly brought out in two policy documents that have recently been given much prominence. The first, entitled "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company," dates back to March 22, 1960, and is regularly referred to as Chairman Mao's great instruction, in which he summed up with genius the experience of China's socialist revolution and the future course of socialist construction. Unfortunately, "the renegade, hidden traitor and scab, Liu Shao-ch'i* and his gang . . . did all they could to block the constitution from reaching the masses."¹

According to the Maoists, it was only after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution thoroughly smashed the "vile counterrevolutionary tricks" of Liu and his few followers that the Anshan Constitution could be submitted to the revolutionary masses for implementation under the vigilant supervision of the army. It should be added that this constitution is often discussed side by side with its rural variant (also dating back to the Great Leap years) known as the "Tachai Work-Point System."

The second major economic policy document is the October 14, 1969, *Red Flag* editorial authored by the Writing Group of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee (as central a body as one is likely to find in China nowadays) and entitled "China's Road of Socialist Industrialization." For all practical purposes, this is the first meaningful economic pronouncement since the launching of the Cultural Revolution and, as such, is mostly remarkable for its compromise.

THE ANSHAN CONSTITUTION

Allegedly sabotaged by Liu and his bureaucrats from 1960 through 1965, the Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company is today offered for the consideration of the

masses as "the proletariat's fundamental law for the running of enterprises and a great program for the exercise by the proletariat of all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the economic sphere."² The five principles of the Constitution are said to reflect "scientifically and incisively" the objective laws of proletarian management of industrial enterprises and are, moreover, a creative development of Marxism-Leninism.

So much for the rhetoric. As a matter of hard fact, the five principles of the Anshan Constitution add up to a thorough revision of orthodox, Soviet-type socialism. Should they be translated into policy—as indeed appears to be the case—they would without a doubt profoundly alter the meaning and operational content of Marxist-Leninist political economy. How much of the Constitution is actually being put into practice, how successfully and with how much dissimulation is a most delicate question, the answer to which will probably not be known for some time. But the attempt to use the Constitution as the basis of the management of China's modern industry is fairly obvious.

The first principle of the Constitution is the old Maoist rule that "correct" politics must be firmly in command of economics. The correctness of politics is judged by politics' strict adherence to the letter and spirit of Mao Tse-tung's thought as his thought happens to be interpreted at any given moment by the factional oracle in power. This is a tricky and dangerous business which spawns all kinds of deviations and prevarications, and often gives rise to a wait-and-see attitude from those who must execute the Chairman's instructions.

The leading role assigned to correct politics is a Maoist elaboration of Lenin's insistence on the importance of political will in the historical process, but it goes well beyond Lenin's most extreme voluntarism. In Mao's view of the universe, the will to change the world is all-important. This will must be trained, disciplined and constantly nourished in the furnace of a permanent superstructural, "cultural" revolution. The revolutionary spirit is ascetic, fearless and

* *Ed. Note:* Former chairman of the People's Republic, who lost all political power during the Cultural Revolution. See p. 165 of this issue.

¹ "Long Live Victory of Constitution of Anshan Iron and Steel Company," by the Writing Groups of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry and of the Anshan Municipal Revolutionary Committee, *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), March 24, 1970, in *Peking Review*, April 3, 1970, pp. 12-13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

self-reliant. Above all, it is totally selfless and completely collective, the collective thinking and acting as one. Fused in Mao Tse-tung's thought, China's millions are to become "one chessboard."³ They will work for the collective joy of working, not for material reward; they will spurn material incentives—those "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie; they will be happy, and if they are not happy or do not look happy, they will be asked to attend struggle sessions, self-criticism meetings, and other cultural events which through "struggle-criticism-transformation" will make them happy and disinclined to listen to the material temptations of "anti-party bourgeois careerists," those "filthy and contemptible dregs of history" like Liu and his men.⁴

The tremendous spiritual force nourished by the thought of Mao is transformed, so goes the argument, into an irresistible material force.⁵ Liu and his men pointed to the experience of the Great Leap Forward as a living denial of this thesis. They vainly struggled against "this objective law independent of man's will" and poured cold water on mass enthusiasm by putting profits in command, utilizing economic methods to manage the economy and corrupting the working class with material incentives. They argued that production should come first and politics later; they relied on experts to run factories, and engaged in other types of counterrevolutionary activity. The Cultural Revolution has allegedly changed all that.

PARTY LEADERSHIP

The second principle of the Anshan Constitution is that party leadership in the economic sphere must be strengthened. The party referred to is, of course, the organization issuing from the Ninth Congress, a battered Maoist tool which at the moment is still—to use a favorite Maoist expression—neither fish nor fowl. This second principle

is even trickier than the first. Essentially, the Maoist thesis is that eventually Mao's thought will so pervade the social body that the masses will automatically do the correct thing without prodding from structured authority, be it the People's Liberation Army or the party. But that is in the very distant future indeed. Moreover, the Maoist view is that a Communist party which goes revisionist—that is, deviates from Mao Tse-tung's thought as correctly understood—must be destroyed from without by the revolutionary masses at large, which is what happened during the Cultural Revolution.

All this does not apply to a truly correct party, like the shadowy one now being reconstructed. Indeed, party rebuilding seems to be of the first priority in China.

The Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. Without this core, the cause of socialism cannot be victorious. . . . Leadership by the Party means leadership by our great Leader Chairman Mao and leadership by Mao Tse-tung Thought.⁶

The trouble is that the present party represents an uneasy alliance of three frequently incompatible elements: representatives of the army; representatives of revolutionary mass organizations (those faction-ridden movements brought to the surface by the Cultural Revolution, trimmed, disciplined a little, and purged since); and reformed party cadres.

The representatives of revolutionary mass organizations, prone to strife and full of grudges, seem to have got the short end of the stick. The reformed cadres cannot really be trusted: one can never be sure whether they are plotting a counter coup.

So the job of party rebuilding and assuring the 50 per cent increases in production really devolves on the army, whose representatives call the tune within the Revolutionary Committees and the increasingly important party core committees — party nuclei operating within the structure of the Revolutionary Committees. So far the civilian party committees (or core groups) appear to be operating almost exclusively at the basic levels—in communes, factories, and schools. There are hints that, in government administration,

³ *China News Analysis*, No. 271 (1960), p. 5. See also *ibid.*, No. 786 (1970), pp. 1–7.

⁴ "Long Live Victory of Constitution . . .," p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

party committees have reached the county level, and there has been at least one reference (in Kwangtung) to a core group at the provincial level.⁷ Presumably, central (Peking) control over basic level party organs and over higher level formations yet to emerge will continue to be exercised through the army command. The dictatorship of the proletariat is thus a dictatorship by the army which is (as of now) loyal to the ruling faction, a not uncommon phenomenon in developing countries.

The third principle of the Anshan Constitution is summed up in the slogan:

Launch vigorous mass movements: trusting and relying on the revolutionary masses is the source of strength for socialist enterprises in winning victories in revolution and construction.

This is not merely an insurance clause against a possible takeover of the renascent party by revisionists and other wicked elements, but a continuation of the economic philosophy—if not fully of the practice—of the Great Leap Forward. Mass movements have been used by both contending leadership factions to run the economy, with this difference, however, that the Liuists preferred to regard them as highly structured and closely controlled supplements to any given economic policy, while the Maoists have tended to rely on them as the principal instruments of economic construction. When they deemed it opportune, they have used mass movements as battering rams with which to crush the resistance of entrenched party and government men who viewed poorly controlled, lightly structured mass movements as an irregular, rural, and guerrilla method of running the affairs of the country.

There was much talk at the end of 1969 and during the first few months of 1970 about a new flying leap in industry and agriculture, spearheaded by mass movements. To some

foreign observers this sounded like a replay of the events of 1958. But the leap does not appear to have developed. Mass movements were limited to water conservation and to conservation of scarce resources, especially coal. People were urged not to "overeat," a superfluous injunction in the light of persistent reports of food shortages.

Stockpiling against the eventuality of war probably played a role in the campaign for thrift. There was an ominous leap in nuclear development, a little discussed top priority of the regime. In September, 1969, two tests were successfully conducted in rapid succession: an underground explosion of about 25-kiloton yield, and a 3-megaton device exploded in the atmosphere. In the spring of 1970, China launched her first orbiting earth satellite. It is probable that by mid-1970 China had some 80 to 100 operational medium-range (ca. 1,000 miles) ballistic missiles (20-kiloton fission warhead) ready for delivery in fixed soft sites, and that work on an initial intercontinental missile capability (about 6,000-mile range, 3-megaton thermonuclear warhead) was well on the way toward realization. At the present time, China has probably the capacity to deliver some dozen or so 3-megaton devices by air, using the 1,700-nautical-mile operational radius TU-16 bomber. A solid-fuel ICBM system on hard-site emplacement is not far off.⁸

Apart from investment in nuclear development, neither 1969 nor 1970 witnessed the launching of any large-scale undertaking that would be likely to make a substantial contribution to the economy. Some years ago, in answer to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's unfraternal taunts about China's confused economic priorities, Chen Yi (then Foreign Minister) assured the Soviets that China would have atomic bombs with or without pants. With a per capita income below \$100 per year, China today is well on the way to possessing the destructive capacity of the world's economic giants.

The Anshan Constitution's fourth principle says that cadres must participate in productive labor and workers must take part in the

⁷ Colina MacDougall, "The Maoist Mould," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 2, 1970, p. 18.

⁸ Charles H. Murphy, "China's Place in Nuclear Stakes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 16, 1970, p. 18. See also my *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Scranton: International Textbook Company, 1970), and *The China Quarterly*, October-December, 1969, pp. 111-131.

management of enterprises (on a rotating basis, it would appear), and that "outdated rules and regulations" (which in left-wing circles cover bonuses and other material incentives) should be revised. The sending of plant managers, engineers, technicians and other experts down to the lathe and coal-shaft level is an old Maoist prescription for the curing of China's age-long disease: the alienation of intellectuals from the working people.

The disease seems to be real enough in most underdeveloped countries, but the Anshan Works prescription is, in the view of some observers, too draconic. If implemented to the letter, it risks disrupting the orderly process of industrial management. Although it may not do much for worker morale, it may yet kill the goose that promises to lay the golden egg. The periodic interchange of managers and workers (theoretically, in Marxist terms, the abolition of the difference between mental and manual labor) is an egalitarian *tour de force* borrowed from the guerrilla experience of the People's Liberation Army (*ante atom*). This has only the most tenuous connection with Lenin's and Stalin's insistence on socialism's need for a trained meritocratic elite capable of tackling increasingly complex problems of engineering and social engineering.

One can never tell, however. The social status gap in China (both before and after the Communist revolution) may indeed have been of such formidable dimensions as to lend credence to Maoist apprehensions. For when the rift is too deep, it affects labor productivity. Whatever the theoretical niceties, there is evidence to show that the manager = worker = manager prescription for China's economic ills has found less than enthusiastic acceptance in managerial and expert circles, and less than wholehearted support in the party. Before the Cultural Revolution:

they [the renegades, hidden traitors, and scabs] trumpeted the "power of decision by one man" [the director]. . . . Liu Shao-ch'i and company stubbornly insisted on having the "system of one-man leadership" because this signboard could

greatly benefit them in building independent kingdoms. . . .⁹

After June, 1969, the worker-manager switchovers appear to have been interpreted somewhat more elastically, not to say revisionistically, by the military in the enterprises whose job it is to put into effect the latest instructions from Peking. Instead of being allowed to run the factories while the managers toiled in the shops, the workers were apparently given an advisory role, accompanied by gestures and flourishes for the benefit of Peking. The tremendous spiritual force attributed by the Anshan Constitution to the unskilled rank-and-file has a way of translating itself into a material force in the form of breakage of costly equipment. In the present state of China's purse, those responsible for enterprise management can hardly allow this to happen.

The wholesale abolition of what the Constitution described as outdated rules and regulations also began to be curbed. Originally, when the Cultural Revolution was at its height, the extremists among the left leadership seem to have believed that the old rules would be replaced by a new social conscience so that few new regulations would be needed. In the event, the disregard for accounting, financial, labor safety, technical, quality control and labor discipline regulations became so widespread that the foundations of China's industrial economy were threatened. It probably made good sense to get rid of some of the Byzantine administrative red tape inherited by the Chinese from their Soviet advisers in the heyday of Sino-Soviet amity. But the fourth principle of the Anshan Constitution overliberated the hamstrung economy. The result was confusion and a relaxation of labor discipline not made any easier by the absence of a clear correlation between the workers' input of effort and their material reward (principle 1). The harping on psychic income, combined with a downgrading of the status of those in positions of managerial and technical responsibility and with a guerrilla contempt for elaborate structures of rules and regulations, may perhaps work where "perfect" socialists

⁹ "Long Live Victory of Constitution . . .," p. 13.

are concerned. But the alchemy of the Cultural Revolution produced an alloy at best, and the alloy responded to the harping and the downgrading and the contempt with "petty bourgeois economism." The Chinese worker clocked in late and clocked out early, took unauthorized vacations, talked back to his superiors, and generally made the already formidable problem of underemployment worse by "lying down" on his job. By June, 1969, the harassed army men participating in the enterprises interpreted the "Get Rid of Old Rules and Regulations" slogan in the easiest way for them and for the state: they simply got rid of overtime pay and dispensed with bonuses and other fringe benefits.¹⁰

The fifth principle of the Anshan Constitution urges all workers to "go full steam ahead with the technical innovations and technical revolution." The intent here is to return to the Great Leap Forward practice of mass innovations and to rely on the inventive genius of the ideologically inspired masses rather than on "bourgeois academic authorities" and less-than-red experts. Neither in 1969 nor in 1970, however, did the mass innovation drive get out of hand as it did during the Great Leap. Several mass-invented projects dismantled after the Leap were put back into commission (e.g., many of the small iron and steel plants in Heilungkiang built during 1958-1959, a sulphuric acid plant at the Dairen Chemical Works, a do-it-yourself reservoir in Liaoning Province, and some one-man coal mines in Chekiang.)¹¹ The movement to reactivate the discredited Great Leap products of the popular imagination does not appear to be nationwide nor does it seem to be as rushed, thoughtless and indiscriminate as it once was. The responses to central directives are diversified and divergent, and the directives themselves do not sin on the side of clarity. From top to bottom, China today conveys the impression of a poorly integrated chessboard

on which random movements are made in search of an elusive compromise between hard reality and Utopian dreams.

THE TACHAI SYSTEM

A word on the officially resurrected Tachai Work-Point System. The system goes back to the early Leap years and represents a rural variant of the Anshan Constitution. Under it commune members' performance is to be measured and rewarded according to a scale of ideological enlightenment, the scale itself being established by correctly politicized pace-setters. The peasant becomes a philosopher and a producer in one. "You are doing very well," the Sankuanmiao Tachai-type peasants were recently told by their proletarian headquarters. "What you are doing seems to have created confusion, but your activity only upsets the bourgeois educational system replacing it with the socialist educational system."¹²

As an incidental advantage, production has risen by 10 per cent or more, even though there may be some confusion in arriving at that figure.

Given the influx of millions of unemployed young people and unreformed or insufficiently reformed party cadres sent down to the country for ideological rectification through labor ("learning philosophy through doing"), it is unlikely that the Tachai system—involving, as it does, an additional burden on the peasants—has found as widespread and enthusiastic an acceptance as articles by the rural writing group in the press would have one believe. But as in the case of the Anshan Constitution, Tachai is a beacon which points the way.

(Continued on page 179)

Jan S. Prybyla is the author of *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Company, 1970), editor of *Comparative Economic Systems* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969) and coeditor of *From Underdevelopment to Affluence: Western, Soviet and Chinese Views* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968).

¹⁰ On the relaxation of labor discipline, see *China News Analysis*, No. 769 (1969), pp. 1-10.

¹¹ *China News Analysis*, No. 788 (1970), p. 6.

¹² "Chairman Mao's Philosophical Thinking Illuminates A Mountain Village," *Peking Review*, March 27, 1970, p. 8.

"The Cultural Revolution has created an unprecedented educational crisis, because of a purge of many able and experienced administrators . . . , the suspension of universities and colleges for about three years, and the closing of most secondary and primary schools during two academic years, 1966-1968."

Education in Mainland China

BY HUNG-TI CHU

Former Professor of Government, Texas Technological University

CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM and intelligentsia suffered an irreparable blow during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party in September, 1965, Chairman Mao Tse-tung pointed to the need to subject bourgeois ideology to criticism and renewed the call for class struggle against recalcitrant intellectual leaders and their influence on the educational system. Shortly thereafter, the rectification campaign against intellectuals was accelerated into a political purge of Mao's opponents.

P'eng Cheng, Mayor of Peking, a senior Politbureau member and First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Communist party, who had openly criticized Mao by declaring that in the face of truth and reason there should be no distinction among classes, became the first important victim of the purge in June, 1966. This was carried out during the absence from the capital of Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic, who had once been considered most likely to succeed Mao. The Maoists asserted that Liu was P'eng's backstage boss, and that P'eng's attack on Mao had the support of former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

At the notoriously enlarged session of the party's Central Committee in early August, 1966, the resolution concerning the Cultural

Revolution was adopted, making educational reform an important aspect of the movement. Subsequently, Liu was stripped of all his official functions in the party and government by another packed meeting of the Central Committee of the party in October, 1968.

It may be recalled that former Chairman Liu, Mayor P'eng and Secretary-General of the Party Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who were Mao's comrades-in-arms during the Long March and Yenan days, differed with Mao on basic political ideology and internal and external policy. Liu, P'eng and Teng believed that with the elimination of landlord classes and with state ownership of major industries and control of commerce, capitalism in China was on its way out; and that China should devote all her resources and energy to economic development and modernization. This policy, which had the support of the majority of the members of the Central Committee of the party, contradicted and challenged Mao's theory of perpetual revolution for the proletarian dictatorship and the People's War of National Liberation.

To wrest the control of the party and government from Liu and his supporters, the Cultural Revolution followed the course charted by Mao when he said at the Central Committee of the party in 1966: "To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all to create public opinion, to

do work in the ideological sphere. . . ."¹ While the ideological aspect of the Cultural Revolution involved a long-range program to transform Chinese political, economic and social institutions and life under the proletarian dictatorship in accordance with Mao's egalitarian theory, the immediate and actual effect involved the utilization of both college and high school students as Red Guards to attack party, government and intellectual leaders who had followed the capitalist and revisionist road. Those students who supported Liu also organized themselves as Red Guards to fight Red Guards. They all established their headquarters in Peking and expanded their organizations throughout the country. In June, 1966, the Cultural Revolution headquarters told students and faculty that university classes and enrollment would be suspended while the curriculum entrance standards and methods of teaching were being revolutionized.

For over two years, all schools were closed while college and high school students rampaged across the country, attacking and terrorizing party, government and educational leaders who refused to conform to their demands. The Red Guard activities and the factional fighting created chaos and turmoil. To restore order, Mao ordered the army to suppress the unruly student Red Guards; and the working class of urban laborers and the poor peasants were organized into teams in the fall of 1968 to take over the administration of schools in urban and rural areas.

While the political aspect of the Cultural Revolution was formally consummated by the holding of the long postponed party congress in April, 1969 (which proclaimed the victory of Maoism and Chairman Mao and his heir-designate, Lin Biao, as the supreme leaders), the educational reconstruction work has only begun. Precisely what educational system will eventually emerge is hard to determine. But the aims of the educational reform adopted by the Central Committee

of the party in August, 1966, are to dislodge bourgeois intellectual domination of the schools and to win the field of education for proletarian ideology. The "4-olds" (ideas, culture, customs and habits) embodied in traditional Chinese thought must be replaced by "the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole society."

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

The development of Chinese thought and education has been a continuing process. The rise and fall of dynasties or various political regimes with varied educational policies characterize China's 4,000-year history. The declining period of the enlightened Chou dynasty (1122-256 B.C.) was the age of Confucius (551-478 B.C.), who inherited the ancient culture accumulated from the brilliant achievements of the early rulers and built his own system of philosophy. When the Chou Empire disintegrated, China entered a period of history known as the period of the Warring States (488-222 B.C.) and Confucius' teaching had to contend with many other schools of thought, often referred to as the "Hundred Schools." With the rise of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-221 A.D.), the Confucian school reasserted itself and an eclectic trend of thought and education continued consciously or unconsciously until the Cultural Revolution.

What are the contents of Confucius' teachings which have influenced Chinese thought and education and have become targets of the Cultural Revolution? Confucius and his followers held that by continuing educational effort a person could be taught to conform to the ethical principles of social relations; that given personal virtue, a well-ordered family—the foundation of a good state—would follow; and that, consequently, if all states were rightly governed, world peace would prevail. The education of the individual came first.

During the former Han dynasty (205-25 B.C.) Confucianism was made a state philosophy and Confucian teachings became the cornerstone of Chinese scholarship and

¹ Quoted in *The China Quarterly*, No. 28, October-December, 1966, p. 158.

bureaucracy. By a system of examinations, officials and administrators were selected on the basis of their achievement in Confucian scholarship. Before the establishment of the modern government schools for foreign languages and technical subjects in the latter part of the nineteenth century, practically all schools in China were private, and Confucian classics and literary subjects formed the backbone of the curriculum.² On the basis of their knowledge of the classics and their literary style and calligraphy, men were selected for public office through civil service examinations. This system, which lasted from the first century to 1905 A.D., constituted the main avenue for the appointment of public officials, and resulted in the creation of a privileged class, the scholar-gentry-official.

THE MODERN SCHOOL SYSTEM

The Opium War (1839–1842) exposed China's weakness. The political and ethical teachings of the Confucian school, which had heretofore provided a way to attain individual culture and national solidarity, proved inadequate to meet the challenge.

To introduce Western knowledge and modern technology for China's defense, a number of government schools were established between 1861 and 1894 to train in-

terpreters, foreign affairs experts, engineers, army and naval officers, and communication technicians.

In 1900, the eight-power military intervention to suppress the fanatic anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion led to accelerated pressure for modern schools. The Boxer Protocol of 1901 imposed severe punitive terms on China. Civil service examinations were suspended. Three years before the formal abolition of the outworn system of civil service, the Manchu government issued the first set of regulations of 1902 concerning higher institutions for the study of Western learning. Soon several institutes of higher education, including Peking University, came into existence. In 1911, Tsing Hua College was founded with the balance of the American Boxer Indemnity Fund remitted to China; it provided a three-to eight-year curriculum of basic training in language and liberal arts subjects for students who were to be sent to the United States for advanced work under a five-year scholarship program.³

Shortly after the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911, the system of higher education was revised to provide for the establishment of universities consisting of departments of arts and sciences, technical colleges of agriculture, engineering, commerce, medicine, law and so forth, and higher normal schools. Institutes of higher learning and secondary and primary schools were organized along Western lines.

In 1928, the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek united China and established the National Government in Nanking. The Nationalist educational program emphasized the spread of universal education, the elimination of illiteracy and the promotion of higher education.

Education on the Chinese mainland subsequently suffered a setback during the eight years (1937–1945) of war with Japan. Of 108 colleges, 91 were either occupied or damaged and 14 were completely destroyed. The government saved 91, moving 77 to a safe area in the interior; national and private universities formed associated centers of higher education, and scores of new colleges were

² It may be of interest to note that throughout the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911 A.D.) the civil service examinations were made up of three main parts: "(1) composition of essays on topics selected from the Four Books (*Analects of Confucius*, *Mencius*, *Great Learning* and *Doctrine of Mean*) and an original poem; (2) essays on topics selected from the five Classics (*Changes*, *History*, *Songs*, *Rites*, and *Spring and Autumn Annals*); and (3) discussion questions." Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 10.

³ In 1925, the College became a national university with several liberal arts schools and a graduate department for Chinese literature and history, and the program of sending all college graduates to study in the United States ceased. Tsing Hua University took a new role under the Communist regime. The engineering departments of Yenching University and the Engineering College of Peking University were incorporated into Tsing Hua to make it a polytechnical university while the graduate school and the colleges of Arts, Science and Law of Tsing Hua together with the corresponding departments of Yenching were merged in Peking University as a general institute of higher learning.

formed during the war. The epic migration of colleges brought a redistribution and decentralization of China's educational institutions.

At the end of World War II, schools moved back to their original campuses but fighting between the Communists and Nationalists soon broke out. In 1947, two years before the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, educational conditions were still considered normal; there were a total of 227 institutions of higher education with some 140,000 students (65 universities, 92 independent colleges and 70 technical colleges), of which 138 were public and 89 were private, including 24 Christian colleges. In the same year, there were 5,892 secondary schools with 1,878,523 students and 790,617 primary schools with 23,813,705 pupils.

IDEOLOGICAL REFORM

When the Communists took over the mainland in 1949, they brought no blueprint for education. Exploiting the existing schools, they introduced ideological and educational reforms to make education an instrument of politics and ultimately to serve the interest of the proletariat. The Maoists regard Confucianism and Western thought, which encourage individual development and intellectual freedom, as feudalistic and bourgeois, to be discarded. Education is to develop a proletarian culture and to train faithful followers of the proletarian revolution capable of doing both mental and manual labor. The task is to be carried out under the direct supervision of party authorities in all fields of cultural and scientific education as repeatedly explained by Mao in the slogan, "Let politics take command."

In conjunction with the ideological reform campaign, in October, 1951, the Government Administration Council promulgated its first education decree entitled "Decision on the Reformation of the Educational System." The implementation of the decree has changed the school system and the character of education. At first, the Soviet system of education influenced the new Chinese school system, but the shortage of Soviet-trained

teachers and Chinese translations of Russian teaching materials, compounded by the wholesale withdrawal of Soviet technical aid and thousands of Soviet experts in the summer of 1960, disrupted Soviet-style educational development. Since then, the Maoists have asserted greater influence over the new school system, which is characterized by the following features: the ideological indoctrination of all students from kindergarten to the college level; the mushrooming of part-time, spare-time and half-study and half-work schools for literacy and vocational training in urban and rural areas; an emphasis on and expansion of technical subjects in the regular school system; the establishment of advanced research institutes of science and special privilege and protection for senior scientists; and the rapid increase in the number of schools and their enrollments.

In spite of Communist efforts to eradicate illiteracy, primary education is neither compulsory nor universally free. The persistent traditional Chinese attitude which regards schooling as an opportunity and a privilege, not as an obligation, has made the need for legal compulsion less important. In the new school system, all primary schools were originally under direct government control in organization, administration, finance and curriculum. But the state has been unable to establish enough schools for all the children of school age, and non-state schools have been set up by factories and communes. In 1951, on the recommendation of Soviet advisers, a revised school system was adopted, reducing the six-year primary term to five years to make it easier for rural areas to establish schools and thus to encourage more people to complete elementary education. In 1953, the government ordered a return to the six-year system, divided into two levels of three years each.

Under the new system, there were three types of secondary school: the general or regular middle school with a preparatory curriculum for college entrance, which dominated secondary education in pre-Communist China; the normal school, which had existed in good numbers before 1949, and which be-

came more vocational; and the vocational and technical school, which has made great strides since 1949. The general middle school provided six grades (three years in junior and three years in senior schools), emphasizing political, linguistic and scientific subjects. In the vocational and technical school with two-to-four-year courses, education in practical subjects and in production techniques received equal attention. Many of the vocational and technical schools are run on a half-work and half-study basis for ideological and practical purposes. There are simply not enough middle schools to accommodate all primary graduates.

A complete reorganization of all institutions of higher education was effected after the establishment of the People's Republic by the amalgamation of similar colleges and schools of different universities into general or composite and polytechnical universities, the elimination of all private institutions, and the creation of technical colleges dealing with a single subject. Following the Soviet system, the concept of comprehensive higher education was rejected. The department was replaced by a "specialty" or a single subject as the new academic unit, to prepare students for a specialized profession. Before the Cultural Revolution there were 43 composite universities, 8 normal universities, 105 colleges of education, and a few hundred technical colleges.⁴ Total college enrollments increased from 117,000 in 1949 to 810,000 in 1959; the overwhelming majority were studying scientific and technical subjects.

During the initial period of the Communist rule, minor parties and social organizations which supported Communist policy were allowed to exist; private enterprises and the bourgeoisie were tolerated; and the co-operation of intellectuals and students was solicited. Mass campaigns were conducted

for economic and social change in 1951–1953, following the outbreak of the Korean War (which provided the government with a "just" reason to terminate all religious and foreign schools) and the introduction of the first five-year plan (1953–1957). Although the "3-Anti" and "5-Anti" movements were directed mainly against privileged economic classes, an ideological line between the working class and the bourgeoisie was clearly drawn, and measures were taken against intellectuals who tried to maintain intellectual independence and integrity. During this short period, scores of prominent intellectuals including Ma Yin-ch'u and Lu Chih-wei, the presidents of Peking and Yenching Universities respectively, were forced to confess their cultural sins, in public and many recalcitrant presidents and deans were replaced by party members.⁵

These movements did not completely silence intellectual dissidents, and there was student unrest and protest before the "Blooming and Contending" of 1957. Following Mao's permission to "let the hundred flowers bloom and hundred schools of thought contend" and his decision to use persuasion instead of coercion in solving contradictions in a Communist state, there was a widespread intellectual attack (in early 1957) on the regime's "subjectivism, secretarianism and bureaucratism." The unreserved criticism of the Communists shocked the authorities, and in the fall of 1957 measures known as the "rectification campaign" against intellectual critics and party personnel were adopted. A large part of the student body was placed

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⁴ For a list of the new technical colleges see Chiu-Sam Tsang, *Society, Schools and Progress in China* (N. Y.: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 193.

⁵ For the excerpted text of these two and other confessions see Stewart Fraser (ed.), *Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), pp. 104ff.

Hung-Ti Chu served as chief of the research and information department of the Chinese News Service in the United States from 1942 to 1946. From 1946 to 1947, he was area specialist and chief of the Asia-Africa and Trusteeship Council Sections in the United Nations; in 1967–1968, he became a professor of government at Texas Technological University. Dr. Chu has been a contributor of articles on China to *Britannica Book of the Year* since 1941.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON CHINA

MODERN CHINA'S SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL FORM. EDITED BY JACK GRAY. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1969. 379 pages and index, \$10.50.)

This volume is an outgrowth of a study group on China and the world, organized under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Its 10 essays are authoritative, informative and well written. The contributors are specialists in their particular fields.

The essays cover a wide range: from the historical antecedents of the Chinese Revolution to the early implantation of socialist currents in twentieth century China; from the early period of the Kuomintang to the organization and political role of the Chinese Red Army; from the performance of party cadres to the problem of non-Chinese minorities. That they are "as a whole historical rather than analytical" in no way diminishes their contemporary value. Indeed, as the editor notes, "the experience of the present Chinese leaders . . . is so far from our own experience of politics that we must bring to its study a strenuous effort of historical imagination." This the contributors have done, and in the best tradition of Western scholarship.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

THE COMINTERN AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 1928-1931. BY RICHARD C. THORNTON. (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1969. 246 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.50.)

The role of Moscow (operating through the Comintern) in shaping and guiding the Communist movement in China during the critical 1927-1931 period is a subject of continuing controversy among scholars.

In this persuasive, well documented study, Professor Thornton offers an interpretation which differs from that of specialists such as Benjamin Schwartz, Robert North, and John Fairbank.

Thornton's conclusions are four: "First, the Comintern set forth in 1928 a policy of guerrilla warfare and subversion with emphasis on the countryside. Second, over the following two-and-a half year period between June, 1928, and January, 1931, the Comintern consistently called for the application of this strategy in directives to the Chinese Communist Party." Third, the Li Li-san approach, which sought to engineer revolts in urban centers, was a deviation from the Comintern strategy. Fourth, "the basic motivation for the 'Li Li-san line' was essentially Li Li-san's endeavor to secure the power of undivided party leadership in his own hands, and to prevent that power from passing into the hands of commanders of the growing Red Army, notably Mao Tse-tung."

This is a serious study, deserving careful attention and discussion; if correct, it will stimulate reevaluations not only of Mao's rise to power but of Soviet policy in China.

A.Z.R.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. BY JAMES R. TOWNSEND. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 233 pages, bibliography and index, \$2.25.)

The Townsend volume, an updated version of a work completed before the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, is valuable in describing the overall nature of the Chinese Communist system—especially its more prominent symbolic features. These include party restraints on the electoral process through propaganda campaigns, the selection and

training of cadres and the management of legal organs, such as congresses and people's tribunals. It should not be forgotten that the Chinese People's Republic considers itself to be constitutionally a democratic state; power is theoretically justified and wielded by such decision-making bodies as local and national congresses.

It is to the author's great credit that he studies both concepts and practices of political participation by the masses in their legal organs. Moreover, he gives considerable and valuable attention to the methods whereby the peasants—numerically the most important single "group" in the Chinese population and also the least proletarianized—are prepared psychologically to participate in small group discussions, criticisms and decisions. By inducing the peasant to believe that his acts of participation in civic life have political implications, the party controls both the level and the intensity of political activity. This book is a superb summation of the nexus between Chinese public opinion and party leadership, doctrine and organization.

René Peritz

Indiana State University

HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTIATES. BY ARTHUR LALL. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968. 301 pages, notes and index, \$2.95.)

An international lawyer's treatise, *How Communist China Negotiates* is a succinct discussion of Chinese international relations, relevant to the talks on Laos of 1961–1962, which grew out of the Geneva conferences of that period. These were to culminate in an international agreement signed by the United States and Communist China, among other participants.

The conference of 14 nations on Lao-tian affairs was a meeting of first magnitude in the current state of international diplomacy, and was particularly notable for introducing Chinese diplomats and diplomatic attitudes to the Western world. Their negotiating techniques were to prove to be surprisingly pragmatic, specific and

relevant. In the many Laos sessions, the Chinese surprised both friends and adversaries by avoiding ideological bombast and demonstrating patience and care in presenting their position papers. Peking's approach to problems was expectedly China-oriented, but unexpectedly focused on short-range objectives. About the latter, it can be said that the Chinese acceded to the nonalignment and neutralization of certain territorial areas. Asians and Westerners involved in the international bargaining came away impressed by Chinese astuteness and hardheadedness.

As a member of the Indian delegation to the conference, Lall interprets Chinese thinking on world war and peace issues and discusses their relevance for Asia and the United States.

R.P.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE NEXT DECADE. EDITED BY A. DOAK BARNETT AND EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970. 249 pages, \$7.50.)

Published for the National Committee on United States-China Relations, this book is an edited version of the proceedings of a 1969 conference held by the organization. Each chapter presents the opening statements of members of the panel dealing with the topic of the chapter, followed by a record of the discussion and question period. While the succinct position papers of the all-star panelists undoubtedly provided excellent starting points for discussions, they do not combine into a satisfactory book.

The statements rest on the (usually conceded) authoritativeness of their makers; they rarely provide either careful elaboration and development or substantiating evidence. Both the opening statements and the ensuing discussions provide differing and sometimes conflicting points of view; they are often interesting and sometimes provide insights which would be missed in a conventional article. But the

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Nixon Administration Statement on U.S.-China Relations

In a speech to the American Political Science Association in New York on September 5, 1969, Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson stated the policies of the Nixon administration with regard to Communist China, Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations. Excerpts from his speech follow:

In the case of Communist China, longrun improvement in our relations is in our own national interest. We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are not our affair. We could not fail to be deeply concerned, however, with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach of international peace and security. Our national security would in the long run be prejudiced by associating ourselves with

either side against the other. Each is highly sensitive about American efforts to improve relations with the other. We intend, nevertheless, to pursue a long-term course of progressively developing better relations with both. We are not going to let Communist Chinese invective deter us from seeking agreements with the Soviet Union where those are in our interest. Conversely, we are not going to let Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring Communist China out of its angry, alienated shell.

Mao Tse-tung's May Day Speech, 1970

At a May Day ceremony in Peking on May 1, 1970, Chairman Mao Tse-tung sharply criticized the United States for its policies in Indochina, with particular mention of United States policies in Cambodia. A broadcast of the text was monitored in Tokyo and is reprinted here:

A new upsurge in the struggle against United States imperialism is now emerging throughout the world. Ever since World War II, United States imperialism and its followers have been continuously launching wars of aggression and the people in various countries have been continuously waging revolutionary wars to defeat the aggressors. The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today.

Unable to win in Vietnam and Laos, the United States aggressors treacherously engineered the reactionary coup d'état by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique, brazenly dispatched their troops to invade Cambodia and resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, and this has aroused the furious resistance of the three Indochinese peoples.

I warmly support the fighting spirit of Samdech

[Prince] Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, in opposing United States imperialism and its lackeys. I warmly support the joint declaration of the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples. I warmly support the establishment of the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea.

Strengthening their unity, supporting each other and persevering in a protracted people's war, the three Indochinese peoples will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete victory.

While massacring the people in other countries, United States imperialism is slaughtering the white and black people in its own country. Nixon's fascist atrocities have kindled the raging flames of the revolutionary mass movement in the United States. The Chinese people firmly support the revolution-

ary struggle of the American people. I am convinced that the American people who are fighting valiantly will ultimately win victory and that the fascist rule in the United States will inevitably be defeated.

The Nixon Government is beset with troubles internally and externally, with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad. The mass movement of protest against United States aggression in Cambodia has swept the globe.

Less than 10 days after its establishment, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia was recognized by nearly 20 countries. The situation is getting better and better in the war of resistance against United States aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The revolutionary armed struggles of the people of Korea, Japan and other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese militarism by the United States and Japanese reactionaries, the struggles of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against the United States-Israeli aggressors, the national liberation struggles of the Asian, African and Latin-American peoples, and the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of North America, Europe and

Oceania are all developing vigorously.

The Chinese people firmly support the people of the three Indochinese countries and of other countries of the world in their revolutionary struggles against United States imperialism and its lackeys.

United States imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its deathbed struggle. In the world of today, who actually fears whom? It is not the Vietnamese people, the Laotian people, the Cambodian people, the Palestinian people, the Arab people or the people of other countries who fear United States imperialism; it is United States imperialism that fears the people of the world. It becomes panic-stricken at the mere rustle of leaves in the wind. Innumerable facts prove that a just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support.

A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big nation. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of history.

People of the world, unite and defeat the United States aggressors and all their running dogs!

Pravda Editorial on Chinese Imperialism, 1970

On May 18, 1970, Tass, the Soviet news agency, distributed an English translation of an editorial in Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, attacking the Chinese leaders. The translated editorial follows:

At a time when the peoples of the world extensively marked the Lenin centenary, the Peking leaders came out in unison with imperialism's malicious anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign. Peking timed a new phase in the fanning of enmity and hatred for the Soviet Union, for countries of the socialist community, for Communist and workers' parties of the world, to coincide with the centenary of Lenin's birth.

Imperialist propagandists are echoed in Peking, which repeats their concoctions about the "aggressiveness" of the U.S.S.R., about the "crisis" of Soviet economy. It galvanizes Trotskyite ideas about some sort of "a bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power" and puts a sign of equality between United States imperialism and the Soviet Union, which is labeled "social imperialism."

The people in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the principles of social internationalism, forming the basis of relations between countries of the socialist community, the latter being declared to be "nonexistent" altogether.

Matters have gone so far that Hitler's ravings about the need to "save" the people from the "Slav threat" have been taken out of the mothballs. The people in Peking emulate the ringleaders of the Nazi Reich in attempting to portray the Soviet Union as a "colossus with feet of clay," clamoring about the Soviet "paper tiger" and threatening to "pierce it on the first attempt."

Such sheer absurdities fill the series of articles that appeared in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, *Hung Chi* and *Chie-Fang Chun Pao* in April, as well as the article published for May 1.

These articles show that it has become customary in Peking to resort to methods of increasingly more arrogant political and ideological provocations that are so characteristic of imperialist propaganda.

The Chinese People's Republic is living through an acute crisis in all spheres of political, economic and spiritual life. The Communist party has been smashed. Constitutional bodies of people's power, trade unions, the youth league and other democratic organizations and professional unions of

intellectuals have been dismissed.

Bodies of power in China are patterned on a militaristic model inherited from the Chiang Kai-shekists. All power is concentrated in the hands of the military.

Not a single work of fiction was published in the country in the last four years, not a single feature film was made and museums and libraries are closed. But books of Mao's quotations and his other "works" have been put out in three billion copies.

More than 70 million children of school age have been deprived these years of a possibility to study normally at school. The country did not get millions of specialists because studies at establishments of higher education have been suspended.

Only the first Chinese five-year plan was successfully accomplished. At that time China ranked one of the first in the world in the rate of development. But the second five-year plan was frustrated by the Big Leap and the third by the Cultural Revolution. As a result, industrial output did not attain the indices set by the second and third five-year plans. It remains at the 1959 level.

In 1959, China generated 41.5 billion kilowatt-hours of power, and produced 348 million tons of coal, 3.7 billion tons of oil, 18.4 million tons of steel.

Last year, China produced 60 to 65 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, 210 to 225 million tons of coal, 12 to 13 million tons of oil, 12 to 13 million tons of steel. The production of grain remained at the 1957 level, and amounted to 185 to 190 million tons, while the yield of seed cotton did not exceed 1.6 million tons.

One should take into consideration that the growth of population in China is about 10 million a year, according to Peking statistics. Thus, in the last decade the per capita output of many major types of industrial and agricultural products not only did not increase but has shrunk.

For a number of years the Chinese leadership has been promoting in Asia a line of undermining progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states and isolating the national liberation struggle of the peoples from their genuine allies—the countries of the socialist community, the international Communist and workers' movement.

By acting thus, Peking shows the imperialists that it does not intend to take concerted actions with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries against imperialist aggression. This stand doubtlessly encourages imperialist quarters to carry out their antipopular designs and plans. The latest events in Indochina bring added proof of this.

By their actions the Peking leaders leave no doubt that they strive to use the heroic freedom struggle of the peoples in their global intrigues that stem from the Great Han dreams of becoming new emperors of "the Great China" that would

rule at least Asia, if not the whole world.

This policy absolutely contradicts the interests of the world socialist system, of the international Communist and working-class movement and the national liberation struggle of the peoples, and it contradicts the genuine interests of the Chinese people itself. "Superrevolutionarism" in words and betrayal of the class interests of working people in deeds—such is the genuine essence of Maoism in the field of international relations.

While exposing the anti-Leninist, antipopular essence of the political and ideological views of China's present leaders, the Soviet Central Committee and the Soviet government constantly have sought and are seeking to prevent ideological differences from spreading to the area of interstate relations.

At the talks in Peking the Soviet Union holds a clear and unambiguous position on the question of normalizing the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border.

But we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that a militaristic psychosis is being stubbornly fanned in Peking and demands are made of the people "to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war." Even the recent launching of a satellite is being used to whip up nationalistic passions and for threats against our country.

If all this is being done to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, it can be said in advance that these efforts are being made in vain. The Soviet people have strong nerves. Our people have all that is necessary to uphold the interests of their homeland.

We proceed from the premise that the cardinal, long-term interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples not only do not contradict each other, but coincide.

CHINA IN THE ARAB WORLD

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from those of a well-known author for children, Kamal el-Kilani, to accounts of the struggle for women's rights in Syria. China has even produced a gramophone record of the Arab vocalist Um Kalthum.

On the level of cultural development and propaganda, it is clear that the Chinese have been very successful. The problem of persuading the masses is one question. To affect the course of nations is another, and therein lies the dividing line between propaganda and diplomacy.

THE POWER OF THE CHINESE MILITARY

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form of revolutionary committees began, the existence of the military control committees was a tremendous advantage to the military leaders. It meant that, insofar as order existed, the military were already in control of the political situation in the large majority of provinces.

NEW ORGANS OF POWER

Early in 1967, the regime began the tedious process of rebuilding a political structure, establishing unique institutions known as revolutionary committees. These committees, the "new organs of power," are supposed to be tripartite and to consist of "revolutionary rebels" (Mao's activist supporters), revolutionary cadres (bureaucrats) and the military.²⁸

Because of factionalism and conflicts among Maoist groups, and among the revolutionaries, the old bureaucrats and the soldiers, the establishment of revolutionary committees has been a slow process. But statistics demonstrate that the military have largely controlled the committees, with the general

exception of lower-level agricultural organizations.²⁹

When all 29 provincial-level committees were finally established in September, 1968, 19 of the chairmen were active general officers; another was the chief security officer of the state. Six more were old civilian party officials, who held the title of commissar of a military region or district. Of the first vice-chairmen, 20 of the 29 were generals.³⁰ Military power has increased in the provinces; and the military have also infiltrated the central government.

During and since the Cultural Revolution, senior P.L.A. officers have been highly visible at the great public rallies and ceremonies in Peking. Generals³¹ from the capital and the provinces have been paraded like a Praetorian Guard. Until late 1968, a veil of secrecy covered the relationships between the P.L.A. and the State Council and lesser organs of the central government; still, there was indirect evidence that military officers were in the ministries of the heavily purged State Council.

It is also believed that in a few cases military control committees have been established in strategic ministries or bureaus.³² Some specialists believe that the P.L.A. moved in to supervise the majority or all of the ministries.³³ Finally, at the October 1 National Day ceremonies in 1968, official reports began to note the presence of P.L.A. representatives from departments of the party Central Committee and of the State Council. The military representatives were listed first.³⁴ More recent reports have continued to note the presence of P.L.A. officers in the party and government offices.

In addition to their unusual influence in the revolutionary committees and the central government, the military have been playing a major role in the reorganization of the Communist party, and control of the party will be a crucial factor in the future domination of the state. As party leader, Mao Tse-tung had no serious intention of destroying the party. In fact, party rebuilding was said to be a basic part of Mao's "strategic plan."³⁵

²⁸ *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), No. 3 (February 1, 1967), in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (S.C.M.M.), No. 563, pp. 1-6; *Peking Review*, No. 12 (March 17, 1967), pp. 15-16.

²⁹ "The Revolutionary Committees and the Party . . .," *Current Scene*, April 15, 1970, p. 6.

³⁰ Wang Yun, "Maoist 'Revolutionary Committees': Organization and Prospects," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), December, 1968, pp. 3-7; Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes," *Asian Survey*, January, 1969, pp. 6-7.

³¹ Military ranks were officially abolished in 1965, but the P.L.A.'s leaders still command large military forces.

³² *Peking N.C.N.A.* in Chinese, August 24, 1967; *Chengtu Provincial* in Mandarin, November 13, 1967; *The New York Times*, February 11, 1967, p. 1.

³³ Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1969, p. 10; *Fei-ch'ing yen-chiu* (Studies on Communist China), Taipei, May, 1968, p. 8.

³⁴ *Peking Review*, No. 40 (October 4, 1968), p. 12 & p. 20.

³⁵ Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," *Asian Survey*, June, 1968, p. 483.

What he wanted to do was purge the party of his enemies, revitalize it and reorganize it. No sooner had he sponsored the disruption of the party apparatus than he promoted the reconstruction of the party. This has proved to be a very slow and painful process. Internal conflicts have involved elements of the same groups who have been struggling against each other in the revolutionary committees—the revolutionaries, the cadres and the military.

The Communist party was first shattered by attacks from nonparty organizations, the Red Guards and the revolutionary rebels; then responsibility for rebuilding the party was given primarily to the nonparty revolutionary committees, which are largely dominated by the military. Furthermore, the party committees of the largely intact political apparatus inside the P.L.A. have also played an important role in reorganizing the civil party. This is certainly an unorthodox method of Communist party building. However, the extensive role of the armed forces in the reconstruction of the party has been partially camouflaged. The P.L.A.'s party committees and "support the left" personnel have usually been referred to as "helping" the revolutionary committees or other groups involved in party reorganization.³⁶ Yet it is often apparent that the military personnel have provided the leadership or taken the initiative; some analysts even believe that the party apparatus in the armed forces has been

playing the primary role in reorganizing the civilian party or at least has served as a nucleus in rebuilding the party.³⁷

It was at the Ninth Party Congress in April, 1969, that the military leaders really demonstrated their greatly increased political influence. Yet the newly elected Central Committee and Politburo represent an obvious attempt to achieve a counterbalance.

PARTY-SOLDIERS

At the Congress, in an unprecedented move, the new party Constitution named Marshal Lin Piao as Mao's legal heir.³⁸ When (after what appeared to be extensive bargaining and sparring for advantage) the large new Central Committee was finally named, party-soldiers constituted almost 45 per cent of the total 279 members. Some 70 members held both military and revolutionary committee posts. The membership of the new Central Committee also indicated a significant decentralization of power. For example, 80 senior officers from the military regions or their subordinate districts were elected as regular or alternate members of the Committee. This figure included all known commanders and all but one known chief commissar of the military regions. Despite the shift in representation toward the provinces, the central headquarters and departments of the P.L.A. were also well represented with at least 34 representatives on the Central Committee.³⁹ No wonder the Soviets had claimed that the Chinese party's control of the armed forces was "in jeopardy."⁴⁰ The senior officers of the P.L.A. had obviously become far more powerful than Mao had originally intended.

The paramount Politburo that was "elected" by the new Central Committee in April, 1969, consisted of 21 members and four alternates.⁴¹ Marshal Lin Piao is the only military man on the five-man Standing Committee, but even if the aged Marshal Chu Te is excluded, nine members and one alternate are party-soldiers. Another member is Marshal Lin's wife, Yeh Ch'un. This concentration of military men on a politburo is unique in the world Communist movement.

³⁶ *Nihon Keizai*, December 9, 1967, in *Daily Summary of Japanese Press*, December 14, 1967, p. 25; *Wen-hui pao*, edit., February 3, 1968, by Shanghai City Service in Mandarin, February 2, 1968.

³⁷ See "Military Imprint on the Nation," *China News Analysis* (C.N.A.) No. 732 (November 8, 1968), p. 4; *Washington Post*, April 2, 1969, p. A1; G. D. Deshingkar, "The Ninth Party Congress," *China Report* (New Delhi), May-June, 1969, p. 36.

³⁸ *The Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), pp. 5-6.

³⁹ Cf., "An Analysis of the CCP Ninth Central Committee," *Facts and Features* (Taipei), May 14, 1969, pp. 10-12; *K.D.K. Information* (Tokyo), No. 5/69 (May 1, 1969), p. 4.

⁴⁰ Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, August 2, 1968.

⁴¹ "Press Communiqué of the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee . . .," *Peking Review*, No. 18 (April 30, 1969), pp. 48-49.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

The composition of the new Central Committee and Politburo represents an intricate balance of various forces. Having purged the most influential and conspicuous members of the opposition, the Mao-Lin regime has obviously been engaged more recently in a balance of power contest with leading party and regional figures. The regime itself appears to be a shifting coalition in which Mao, the "Great Helmsman," seeks to balance groups and factions.

On the Central Committee, the numerous party-soldiers are partially counterbalanced by civil officials and "revolutionaries," but their influence is weakened by factionalism within the officers corps. The distribution of committee memberships among officers from the various regions, districts and general departments indicates that the previous informal system of sharing important posts among the five old field army factions in the P.L.A. is still operating. It even includes a few officers from the out-of-favor First Field Army of the purged Marshals Peng Te-huai and Ho Lung. However, there is an important bias in favor of the old lieutenants of Lin Piao. About half of the military members of the regular committee are believed to belong to Lin's faction or at least have served under him during key periods.⁴² A balance has also been preserved between political officers and commanders or staff officers from the regions and provinces.⁴³

Unlike the Central Committee, the Politburo has been heavily weighted with central officials, most of whom are active supporters of Mao and Lin. Despite the heavy emphasis on military men in the Politburo, Marshal

Lin is the only party-soldier on the five-man Standing Committee. Furthermore, half the senior officers on the Politburo are old subordinates of Lin Piao; the others come from field army groups. Three influential ex-marshals, who are leading officers of field army factions, were dropped from the Politburo. But an effort was made to placate them by naming them as vice-chairmen of the Military Affairs Committee of the party and by listing their names ahead of other members of the Central Committee.⁴⁴ The membership of the influential Military Affairs Committee also appears to be divided between Lin's supporters and the members of other factions. The same is believed to be true of the powerful commanders of the military regions. Thus a complex balance of power exists, which gives the Mao-Lin regime at least the preponderance of power and control.

THE FUTURE

Despite the vastly increased influence of the military in Communist China, they have not become independent warlords; rather they now operate within a decentralized system they help to shape and in which they are involved in a struggle for power. In part because of the Soviet threat against China's security, the P.L.A. appears to have partially withdrawn from a number of nonmilitary activities. Yet the military still have their hands on many strategic and economic levers of power. Furthermore, there is no tendency for them to withdraw from their influential positions on the revolutionary committees, the party or the central government. Their political roles in turn are buttressed by their other activities. The senior officers of the P.L.A. are both party leaders and commanders of the armed forces of a developing state; they are also Chinese. The history of modern China, of the Communist movement, and of developing states indicates that party leaders and generals do not normally withdraw gracefully from power.

If the aged Mao Tse-tung dies without rebuilding an effective, united, civilian-oriented party and government (and it is very unlikely

⁴² See Fang Chun-kuei, "Factionalism in Peiping's Armed Forces," *Chinese Communist Affairs*, April, 1967, pp. 11-17; Huang Chen-hsia, *Chung-kung chun-jen chi* (English title, *Mao's Generals*), (Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968), *passim*; "The Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *What's Happening on the Chinese Mainland* (Taipei), June 15, 1969.

⁴³ See the sources in note 42; also "Personnel Data of the 9th CCP Central Committee Members," *Issues and Studies*, July, 1969, pp. 93-106.

⁴⁴ For example, see *Peking Review*, No. 21 (May 23, 1969), p. 8.

that he can rebuild them), we shall almost certainly be confronted by a new political phenomenon, a Communist military regime. Mao's official heir, Marshal Lin Biao, is a military officer and his support comes primarily from the armed forces. Yet even if Lin loses control because of recurring ill health or a power struggle, other party-soldiers are in a position to dominate the party and the state. The skills of the bureaucrats and administrators will be essential, but in past periods of disorder many Chinese civil officials have been willing to serve military leaders until civil rule finally returned. Today, many civilians are already serving under military men in the evolving party and government structures. The 'reviving party may again replace the army as the "main form of organization" in China, but the generals may control that party.

CHINA AND JAPAN

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memories, but so far without much effect. The Japanese are not loved in such areas as Indonesia, where they are known as the "Yellow Yankees" or the "Ugly Japanese," but they are needed and grudgingly respected.

United States and Japanese officials are emphasizing that Japan must play a central role in reconstructing both Vietnams after fighting ceases. If Japan does not do so, China and the Soviet Union will gain considerably greater political and economic advantages in Indochina. The Japanese need little encouragement. Their businessmen are in increasing evidence in Indochina, and one large Toyko firm has established a Vietnam Reconstruction Committee in anticipation of the time when it can move freely in both North and South Vietnam.⁵ Chinese articles discussing this expansion stress, "It is at the behest of their U.S. master that the Japanese

reactionaries" intensify economic exploitation "to realize the rosy dreams of re-establishing the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.'"⁶

A fourth problem complicating Sino-Japanese affairs is the growing cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union. The two nations have agreed to allow Japan Air Lines to fly to Moscow over Siberia, and extensive negotiations continue for an immense cooperative effort to discover and develop Siberian resources. While these talks progressed in Tokyo or Moscow, Sino-Soviet negotiations to calm their 4,000-mile common border finally broke down, and the Soviets increased the number of their troops along the border from 20 to 26 divisions.

Peking has analyzed the growing "counter-revolutionary collaboration between the Japanese reactionaries and the Soviet revisionist renegade clique" as part of a "global U.S.-Soviet collaboration and part of the U.S. imperialist scheme of aggression against Asia." According to this approach, Japan has joined the Soviet Union and the United States as part of the "imperialist encirclement" of China. When Japan agreed to a Soviet request to build a port in Vrangelya, China commented that if the Soviet Union were "a colony, there would be an excuse for all this. But for an independent country to rely on foreign monopoly capital in building a port is something which one has never heard before."⁷ Yet both Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-Chinese activities continue to expand.

The Japanese enjoy the best of all possible worlds. They sit protected under the United States nuclear umbrella, expand their economy at the world's fastest growth rate, make plans to develop an important military force, and trade profitably with China as well as with Peking's hated enemies, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In his February, 1970, "State of the World Report," President Nixon was justifiably pleased that on important Asian matters the United States and Japan were in agreement. But there may well be unresolvable contradictions between Japan's Asian policies and the Nixon Doctrine. As a member of Japan's Defense

⁵ *Japan Times*, March 1, 1970, p. 3.

⁶ *Peking Review*, No. 4, January 23, 1970, pp. 28-30.

⁷ *Peking Review*, No. 15, April 10, 1970, pp. 36-38.

Agency complained, "It seems that the Pentagon wants us to play the infield while you play the outfield against the Chinese."

With the breakup of bipolarity in Asia and the emergence of Japan as the leading economic power in the area, the two-decade-old United States-Japanese containment of China may be weakening. Japanese economist Keiji Sakamoto doubts his countrymen will follow the United States for the indefinite future: "We have an expression—same bed, different dreams."⁸ This is also a favorite Chinese expression. As Japan continues to make some of those dreams real, perhaps China will not be alone in trying to solve the problems raised by Japanese power.

⁸ Quoted in *Time*, March 2, 1970, p. 38.

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

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in the China seat failed, as it had every time before, with the Nixon administration (like other Republican and Democratic administrations before it) resolutely opposing the move to bring China into the community of nations. But the United States, as "leader of the West," now finds little following for its China policy in particular. Other countries feel a political thaw. It seems probable that both Italy and Belgium are awaiting the outcome of the negotiations between China and Canada before proceeding to try to establish diplomatic relations with China. As Ottawa goes, it may be guessed, so will Rome and Brussels; and that development could result in an abrupt and fundamental shift in the Chinese representation in the United Nations.

China's seating in the United Nations might prove to be a decisive factor in the overall situation. Except for a brief period during which the Maoists romantically thought to organize and lead a rival United Nations of revolutionary countries, Peking has periodically shown a distinct interest in taking up the U.N. membership it considers its just due.

With China's security imperiled, the Maoist

regime would in all probability prove ready to assume China's U.N. seat to gain whatever additional protection its new relationship might offer vis-à-vis the United States as China takes her stand in support of the Indo-Chinese revolution. The avoidance of a major collision between the two countries in that Asian sector will at best prove a matter of great difficulty. Maoist policies have alienated China's Soviet ally and have notably failed to win the sympathy of Japan; it is moreover certain that "the people of the world" would not mass in China's defense in the event of a nuclear war. But with China in the United Nations, paradoxically, at a crucial juncture in Southeast Asian developments, that somewhat bourgeois organization might provide the means for the salvation of revolutionary China.

BOOK REVIEWS

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treatment is inevitably fragmentary and disjointed. R.P.

THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA. By IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 799 pages, illustrations and index, \$14.50.)

Professor Hsu, a distinguished scholar and Chinese historian, has written an excellent study. Having received his early education in China, he knows and respects the people. His temperate account of the events immediately after World War II is particularly welcome. O.E.S.

CHINA'S ECONOMY

(Continued from page 164)

The second major document to issue from the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period is "China's Road of Socialist Industrialization," published in the theoretical organ *Red Flag* in mid-October, 1969.¹³ It may be

¹³ An English translation is available in *Peking Review*, April 3, 1970, pp. 11–15, 38.

regarded as the most explicit and, in many ways, the most practical program for the economy since 1965. It is a compromise document, a blend of "right-opportunist" and "left" lines on the subject of socialist construction, and mirrors the indecisive outcome of the revolutionary upheaval of 1966-1968. The "right-opportunist" elements of "China's Road" are those which restate some of the basic tenets of the moderate economic policy of 1961-1965. They include the thesis that agriculture is the foundation of China's economic development, with industry performing the functions of a "leading factor." Within the industrial sector, heavy industry is to be promoted mainly through the priority development of light industry. "China's Road" stresses the need for self-reliance, but it does so in a spirit far removed from the xenophobia that permeated similar statements during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁴

Even foreign aid may be accepted under proper safeguards:

... Economic mutual aid and cooperation between friendly countries, with each supplying what the other needs, is necessary on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for state sovereignty and independence, complete equality and mutual benefit.¹⁵

The document refers discreetly to the use of resources "in a planned way"—a phrase not heard of in years. The very authorship of the article by the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee appears to suggest a reassertion, indirect to be sure, of central authority. Unlike the Anshan Constitution, "China's Road" speaks of the need to "establish and uphold rational and socialist rules and regulations." There is a short but eminently reasonable reference to the need for the

correct handling of the relationship between coastal and inland industries and between economic construction and national defense so as to bring about a gradual balance in the disposi-

tion and rational geographical distribution of the nation's industry.¹⁶

But like everything else in today's China, the relatively rational, cautious and moderate coexists in the document with the rash, the brash, the leaping, and the exalted.

Calls for vigilance and warnings against hidden traitors, scabs and counterrevolutionaries abound. (In April, 1970, 50 people were reportedly executed in Kwangtung after mass trials at which counterrevolutionary activity was ascribed to the victims).¹⁷ The main rationale for the dispersal of industry is said to be preparedness for war:

With a view to preparedness for war, every area, province and city should pay attention to rational geographical distribution of industries in line with Chairman Mao's instruction: "Various localities should endeavor to build up independent industrial systems. Where conditions permit, coordination zones, and then provinces, should establish relatively independent but varied industrial systems. . . ."¹⁸

This is a guerrilla approach to location theory and policy, an elaboration of Mao's vision of a Communist society of like-minded men living in nearly self-sufficient communes, linked by a common spirit and an undaunted resolve, responsive to moral incentives—a nation of simple soldiers in which there is no bossism, no elite privilege, but only a willing interchange of rank and jobs, a gigantic heaving of the popular will that spontaneously conforms to the thought of Mao. The stress on local self-sufficiency has also a practical and more immediate, not to say grubby, side. It saves the state money and, in the present uncertain condition of central control and central planning, it has the virtue of assuring that each district somehow muddles through.

Politically, in the longer run, it may strengthen localist and separatist sentiments unless the Maoist spiritual revolution occurs. Otherwise the army will have to stay on indefinitely in each locality, school, factory, and commune and the dream of a Communist utopia will remain a dream. Instead, China will be ruled by a military dictatorship of the left, but a military dictatorship all the same.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁷ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 16, 1970, p. 4.

¹⁸ "China's Road . . .," p. 10.

EDUCATION IN MAINLAND CHINA

(Continued from page 169)

under party supervision and sent to the countryside for reform through hard labor; some 800 intellectuals were identified for criticism and confession. The rectification campaign continued during the violence of the Great Leap Years of 1958–1961.

In September, 1958, Mao's belief that education should serve the proletariat hardened, and a directive was issued stating that college and high school students should participate as workers in production during and after their schooling. Half-work and half-study and spare-time schools spread in rural and urban areas. When the Great Leap Forward movement collapsed, many such schools went out of existence. The debate on the question of "red and expert" among party leaders continued, but the opposition to this policy was soon silenced.⁶ In February, 1964, Mao proposed to shorten the school year, simplify the curriculum and expand half-study and half-work schools to all levels, but these proposals were not formally adopted until August 8, 1966, when the packed meeting of the party's Central Committee announced the 16-point decision to initiate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.⁷

EDUCATIONAL CRISIS

The Cultural Revolution has created an unprecedented educational crisis, because of a purge of many able and experienced administrators in the ministries concerned with education and culture, the suspension of universities and colleges for about three years, and the closing of most secondary and primary schools during two academic years, 1966–1968. In the spring of 1967, schools were ordered to resume their classes, but students and teachers ignored the directives.

⁶ Earlier, Premier Chou En-lai had urged that greater respect be shown to scholars for their contribution to the nation.

⁷ The text of the 16-point decision appeared in *Peking Review*, No. 33, August 12, 1966, and is reproduced in *China Quarterly*, No. 28, October–December, 1966, pp. 158–166.

During the Cultural Revolution, there was also a power struggle within various schools. In 1969, the militant Red Guards recruited from colleges and high schools had been disbanded, and over 200,000 of these educated young people and a large number of teachers and school administrators (who were regarded as "bourgeois scholar-tyrants") were sent to farms and factories to do manual labor. Students and teachers were disillusioned with the party and Chairman Mao, and a negative and pessimistic attitude toward the Cultural Revolution and educational reform prevailed as a result of endless ideological campaigns against intellectuals and academic freedom. Educated adults and young people have been discontented, and there has been tension and antagonism between the new administrators and the teaching and student body.

In September, 1968, following Mao's new instructions on the reeducation of intellectuals by learning from the laboring class, and the integration of school graduates with workers, peasants and soldiers, Mao's Thought Propaganda Teams of workers and peasants, with military support, entered all schools and took control away from professional educators. A committee of peasant, mass-movement and party representatives was to be set up at schools to assist in introducing educational reform. The reopening of the schools was meant to coincide with the institution of the educational reform program. The pre-1966 system of education influenced by former Chairman Liu and his Revisionist followers was denounced by the Maoists as not revolutionary enough and impractical. The reform movement, which bears the stamp of the ideas and personality of Chairman Mao, lays emphasis on political education, military training, general education, farm skills and industrial labor at the expense of academic and intellectual attainment.

The task of restoring formal education under the leadership of the Propaganda Teams has proved to be difficult and slow. Most if not all of the team members are not trained educators, and for the present they

must depend on the support of bourgeois intellectuals to develop reform programs. Many of the existing administrators and teachers who have not recovered from the political and physical abuses of the Cultural Revolution are no longer enthusiastic in making any proposals. By the end of 1969, no overall reform plan covering the structure and content of the school system at all levels had been made public. Nevertheless, proposals and experiments have been made by various schools, and a draft outline has been published for educational reform in the countryside. Evidently, priority is being given to rural education in connection with plans for urban dispersal and the resettlement of some 20,000,000 people in the countryside and for stepping up "war preparations" by building arsenals and granaries in the villages. On the basis of fragmentary reports and comments on educational reform by the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, certain trends in the reform movement may be observed.

DECENTRALIZATION

The basic unit of educational administration is being changed by a decentralized policy which has reversed the pre-1966 policies of centralizing education control in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. In rural districts, the communes have taken responsibility for secondary schooling and the production brigade has taken responsibility for primary schooling; while in urban areas, neighborhood committees and factories are responsible for primary and secondary schools. Financial responsibility is being transferred from the government directly to the farms and factories. The total period of schooling is to be reduced to nine years, and age qualifications have been abolished, thus allowing those who have missed schooling to enter late.

The coalescing of former primary and secondary schools indicates that senior middle schools are on their way out, and that junior middle schools will be devoted largely to ideological and practical training and

actual labor. For ideological training, students are required to memorize the Little Red Book, *Quotation from Chairman Mao*, and to read the four volumes of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. The reform of admission policies gives preference to the children of poor parents. After graduation, students are to remain in the countryside or in the plant to work for a couple of years. Entrance to colleges is to be recommended by communes and revolutionary committees on the basis of students' actual working experience and political maturity, instead of being achieved by examination in academic subjects. Only politically reliable and work-hardened laborers are to be selected for college education, and after graduation they are expected to return to labor.

At the university level, the situation remains obscure because many universities have only recently resumed teaching. However, the reform proposals made by various universities and colleges indicate that vocational training will be given greater emphasis; the curriculum will be simplified and oriented toward meeting the needs of economic production; and the period of higher education will be reduced to two to three years.

Mao's principle of education is to teach the masses to practice such proletarian virtues as austerity, loyalty, dedication and egalitarianism, allowing no individual freedom. This new education should produce the proletarian revolutionary who is technically creative and at the same time is a political automaton—an idealistic aim. When the educational reform under Mao is fully implemented it will have a far-reaching effect on China's future. However, the reform may not outlast Mao. No one can predict with assurance how long Mao can stay in power. What the political system on the mainland will be after Mao is equally difficult to anticipate. The post-Mao era may bring about another transitional period in China's modern political development. It is likely that any political regime after Mao will be more moderate. Consequently, his educational revolution may be no more successful than the Great Leap Forward.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of July, 1970, to provide a day-to-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Central American Common Market

July 25—At the end of a 3-day meeting, economics ministers from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica agree to act within 60 days to strengthen trade ties.

Council For Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)

July 10—Seven members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, sign an agreement to set up an international investment bank in Moscow; Rumania refused in May, 1970, to sign the agreement.

Disarmament

July 21—The 25th session of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks is held in Vienna.

July 24—According to *The New York Times*, the U.S. formally proposes a strategic arms limitation agreement to the Soviet Union. The proposal calls for limits on the number and size of missile and antimissile defense systems but does not rule out improvements in the systems.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *United Kingdom*)

July 4—Karl Schiller, West German Economics Minister, becomes President of the Common Market's Council of Ministers.

July 20—The 6 foreign ministers of the European Economic Community meet in Brus-

sels to decide on tactics to be used in negotiations with Britain over her entry into the organization.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Jordan; Intl. United Nations; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 2—Israeli military headquarters announces the resumption of air strikes against U.A.R. antiaircraft missile sites along the Suez Canal.

July 6—Israeli Major General Haim Bar-Lev, army chief of staff, announces that 3 Israeli planes have been shot down by SAM-2 missiles. Bar-Lev claims the missile sites were installed and are partly manned by Soviet personnel. The Cairo newspaper *Al Ahram* denies that the sites are manned by Soviet crews.

July 10—An Israeli military spokesman reports that Israeli planes have shot down 3 Egyptian MIG-21's.

July 16—An Israeli military spokesman reports that Israeli commandos struck a Lebanese village during the night to retaliate for recent guerrilla attacks from Lebanese territory.

July 17—A Soviet-U.A.R. communiqué is issued in Moscow at the end of U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's visit with Soviet leaders. It calls for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis.

July 20—Israeli jets attack Jordanian Army positions along the Jordan River. Air strikes along the Suez Canal continue.

July 23—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces his acceptance of the U.S. proposal, made on June 19, 1970, for a 90-day cease-fire.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban says that a temporary cease-fire would permit renewed preparations for war.

July 26—The Jordanian government announces acceptance of the U.S. proposal for a 90-day cease-fire in the Middle East.

July 27—U.S. officials report that one of the conditions of the proposed settlement in the Middle East is that Jordan will have to control the activities of guerrilla organizations.

Egyptian fighter-bombers attack Israeli positions in the Sinai peninsula.

July 28—The U.A.R. suspends the radio broadcasting privileges of 2 Palestinian commando organizations. Both organizations have been critical of the Egyptian acceptance of the U.S.-proposed cease-fire.

Reports from Paris indicate that at the intervention of the French Ambassador to the U.A.R., François Pauux, 80 Jewish prisoners, held since the June, 1967, war, have been released by the U.A.R.

July 30—The right-wing Gahal, the 2d largest group in the Israeli Cabinet, votes to resign if even a limited acceptance of the U.S. proposal for a Middle East settlement is approved by the government.

Two minor Palestinian commando groups reject criticism of Nasser for accepting the U.S. proposal.

July 31—The Israeli Cabinet, in a 17-6 decision, votes to accept the U.S. proposal for a limited cease-fire and to begin negotiations with the U.A.R. to find a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

Yasir Arafat, in a public address, declares that the Palestinian commando movement is dedicated to the liberation of all of Palestine, to the rejection of the U.S. proposal and all other compromise solutions in the conflict with Israel. Arafat is chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

(See also *Honduras*)

July 7—Speaking at a White House reception honoring the delegates to the first General Assembly of the Organization of American States, U.S. President Richard Nixon praises the organization.

July 8—The General Assembly of the Organization of American States calls for a convention declaring that acts of terrorism and the kidnapping of foreign diplomats constitute international crimes.

July 13—*The New York Times* reports that a 2-year agreement was signed last week-end between Israel and the O.A.S. Under the terms of the agreement, Israel will carry out projects for development of rural areas in Latin America.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

July 2—At the opening session of the SEATO ministerial council in Manila, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman denounces "some Western politicians" for harassing member governments to serve the politicians' "domestic personal gains."

In a closed session of the ministerial meeting of SEATO, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers assures the members that U.S. attempts to achieve peace in Indochina will not lead to abandonment of any commitments under the SEATO treaty.

July 3—In the final session of the council and in a subsequent private meeting, Rogers and Thanat clash over Thanat's denunciation of members of the U.S. Senate who have been critical of Thailand.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

July 1—A report in *The New York Times* says that the Soviet Union, in meetings with the other Big Four powers, has made new suggestions for settlement of the Middle East conflict; the chief element in the new proposals is reported to be a formal peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states, not merely a cease-fire.

July 16—A U.N. observer is killed and another wounded by Egyptian fire across the Suez Canal.

July 23—The Security Council in a 12-0 vote approves a tightened arms embargo against South Africa. Britain, France and the U.S. abstain from voting.

War in Indochina

(See also *Cambodia; U.S., Foreign Policy; Vietnam*)

July 3—The Laotian defense ministry announces the recapture of Phou Kate, a mountain that was seized by the North Vietnamese on June 19, 1970.

July 6—After a month-long occupation, Communist forces have withdrawn from the ancient temple at Angkor Wat in Cambodia, according to news reports.

July 8—The South Vietnamese military command announces the beginning of a new drive by 8,000 troops in southeastern Cambodia.

July 9—The signing of a statement in Laos by the 3 members of the International Control Commission on Indochina is announced. The document, which approves efforts of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and the Laotian government to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Laotian conflict, is signed by Poland, India and Canada.

July 11—Vietnamese Communists enter the mountain-top resort of Kirirom, about 60 miles southwest of Pnompenh. The highway linking Pnompenh with Cambodia's principal port, Kompong Som, is threatened.

July 14—Fighting continues on the highway linking Pnompenh with Kompong Som, the chief Cambodian port; Khmer Krom, a group of former mercenaries of the United States Special Forces in South Vietnam, is taking part in the battle.

July 17—President Nguyen Van Thieu and Foreign Minister Tran Van Lan of South Vietnam confer with 3 top leaders of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia.

July 18—North Vietnamese and Vietcong attacks on Longvek, Cambodia, continue.

July 20—Enemy forces fire 2 rockets into Saigon; this is the 4th rocket attack on the South Vietnamese capital this year.

The U.S. command announces that 2,900 American servicemen have been withdrawn from South Vietnam in the last week; the withdrawal has reduced U.S. forces in the war zone to 408,600 men.

July 23—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol, in a 2-day visit to Thailand, fails to obtain assurances of aid from that country.

The Laotian government declares a state of emergency in the nation's 6 southern provinces because of the presence of 3 Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese battalions in the region.

ALGERIA

July 21—The Algerian government keeps its tax on oil exports at 55 per cent but raises the reference price on which the tax is based from \$2.08 to \$2.85 a barrel. Preliminary calculations indicate that this will mean about a 50 per cent rise in tax revenues.

ARGENTINA

July 17—The Argentine government announces that the body of former President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, who was kidnapped on May 29, has been found.

BOLIVIA

July 20—The government announces that a guerrilla band occupied a town 200 miles from La Paz yesterday. The guerrillas burned the offices of a U.S. company and took 2 West Germans as hostages.

July 22—The Bolivian government frees 10 political prisoners in exchange for 2 West German hostages, to accede to guerrilla demands.

BRAZIL

July 24—General Emílio G. Médici, the President of Brazil, denounces vigilante groups, believed to include policemen, which have been responsible for killing criminals in Brazil; he says they will be punished.

BULGARIA

(See *Cuba, Greece*)

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

July 2—Two proclamations are issued that assert that Premier Lon Nol and Deputy Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak jointly have

full power to make all governmental decisions during the war emergency.

July 5—In Phnompenh a military tribunal finds deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk guilty of treason and corruption and condemns him to death in absentia.

CANADA

July 15—Queen Elizabeth II concludes her 10-day tour of the Canadian north and west.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 2—Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk returns to Peking after a 17-day official visit to North Korea. (See also *Cambodia*.)

July 10—French Minister of Planning and Regional Development André Bettencourt confers with Premier Chou En-lai in Peking. They discuss bilateral ties, economic problems and international questions.

July 22—*Hsinhua*, the official news agency, reports the reopening of Tsinghua University in Peking. The school has been closed since 1966.

COLOMBIA

July 15—The Supreme Electoral Court names Misael Pastrana Borrero, the candidate of the National Front of Conservatives and Liberals, the winner in the presidential elections of April 19, 1970. The recount was necessary because supporters of his opponent, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, charged fraud.

July 19—On the eve of the inauguration of the new Congress, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo imposes a state of seige; the action suspends constitutional rights.

Former Foreign Minister Fernando Londono y Londono, who was kidnapped on July 9, is released after his family pays \$100,000 in ransom. The kidnappers are identified as members of the pro-Castro National Liberation Army.

July 20—Violence mars the opening of Congress; members of the opposition in the House and Senate smash furniture before being evicted by the police.

CUBA

July 6—Premier Fidel Castro replaces the Minister of the Sugar Industry and the Minister of Education.

July 15—Havana radio reports the Cuban sugar crop at 8,466,072 tons; this record crop is short of Cuba's 10-million-ton goal.

July 25—Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist party and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, arrives for an 11-day official visit.

July 26—Castro admits that the effort to harvest 10 million tons of sugar this year failed; he offers to resign.

CYPRUS

July 6—Unofficial results in yesterday's elections, the first in 10 years, are announced. The Unified party emerges as the strongest party in the House of Representatives; the Cypriote Communists increase their representation from 5 to 9 out of 50 seats.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

July 8—The Federal Assembly unanimously votes to dismiss former party leader Alexander Dubcek from his position as a deputy and accepts the resignation of Oldrich Cernik, a former Premier.

EIRE

(See also *United Kingdom*)

July 8—Speaking after a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in London, Irish Foreign Minister Patrick J. Hillery rejects official British criticism of his secret tour of a riot-torn section of Belfast in Northern Ireland on July 6.

EL SALVADOR

(See *Honduras*)

FINLAND

July 14—Dr. Ahti Karjalainen, a former Premier, forms a new coalition government with the support of at least 142 of the 200 members of Parliament. The new government has 9 non-Socialist members and 8 Socialists.

July 20—President Urho Kekkonen returns to Finland after 3 days in the U.S.S.R.

FRANCE

(See also *Germany*)

July 3—The Defense Ministry announces the explosion of a "high power" nuclear device at a testing site in the South Pacific.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 3—French President Georges Pompidou arrives in Bonn where he endorses the attempts made by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to improve ties with the Communist countries of East Europe.

July 11—The *Bundestag*, the lower house of Parliament, approves legislation to combat inflation through a number of tax measures including a 10 per cent refundable surcharge on personal and corporate taxes. The *Bundesrat* (upper house) is expected to approve the measures.

July 20—Replying to an invitation from the government of Chancellor Willy Brandt, the conservative Opposition in Parliament refuses to send a delegate to accompany Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to Moscow for treaty negotiations.

GREECE

July 6—The Greek foreign ministry announces an agreement with Bulgaria; the accord calls for the exploitation of border rivers, the exchange of electric power and the development of tourism.

July 21—Premier George Papadopoulos takes over the post of Foreign Minister.

GUATEMALA

July 1—Colonel Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio, who was elected on March 1, 1970, takes office as President.

HONDURAS

July 16—In the presence of military observers from the Organization of American States, a 2-mile-wide strip of no-man's land is established along the border between Honduras and El Salvador.

ICELAND

July 10—Premier Bjarni Benediktsson, his wife and grandson die in a fire. President

Kristjan Eldjarn asks Johann Hafstein, Minister of Justice and Industry, to take over as acting Premier.

INDIA

July 18—Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the Vietcong's provisional revolutionary government for South Vietnam, arrives in New Delhi on a 9-day visit.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl. Middle East, Organization of American States*)

ITALY

July 6—The 4-party coalition government of Premier Mariano Rumor resigns because of a dispute with the Socialist party.

July 23—Giulio Andreotti, a Christian Democrat, admits defeat in his 12-day attempt to form a new government.

July 25—Christian Democrat Emilio Colombo, Treasury Minister, agrees to try to form a 4-party center-left government.

JAPAN

July 23—A joint communiqué issued at the close of a 3-day ministerial conference by Japan and South Korea reveals that Japan has agreed to increase economic aid to South Korea.

JORDAN

July 7—Government and commando sources report that a formula to insure good relations between the Palestinian commandos and the Jordanian government has been worked out by representatives of the U.A.R., the Sudan, Libya and Algeria.

July 10—An agreement is signed by Jordanian Premier Abdel Monem Rifai and Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

July 13—The North Korean Central News Agency reports that Pak Sung Chul, the Foreign Minister, has been shifted to the post of Second Deputy Premier; Ho Dam becomes Foreign Minister.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

- July 10—President Chung Hee Park declares that the U.S. should not cut back its forces in Korea unilaterally.
- July 16—The National Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution protesting the announced withdrawal of U.S. troops. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

LIBYA

- July 5—The Revolutionary Command Council, Libya's revolutionary government, announces that all 4 oil-distributing companies were nationalized last night.
- July 21—The Libyan government confiscates the property of all Italians and Jews in the country. The Italians will receive no compensation; the Jews will be given government bonds payable over a 15-year period. Italians will not be permitted to work in Libya.

MEXICO

- July 6—Unofficial results of yesterday's presidential election give a sizeable victory to Luis Echeverria Alvarez, the candidate of the Revolutionary Institutional party.

MOROCCO

- July 25—A new constitution which sets up a single-chamber Parliament and gives the King veto power over all legislation is approved in a referendum by 98.7 per cent of the voters. Election of the Parliament in August will end 5 years of absolute rule by King Hassan II.

MUSCAT AND OMAN

- July 26—Reports from Jordan indicate that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Sultan Said bin Taimur, was overthrown in a palace coup on July 23 by his son, Qabus bin Said.

PORTUGAL

- July 27—Former Premier António de Oliveira Salazar dies; he held dictatorial power in Portugal for 40 years until he became ill in September, 1968.

RUMANIA

- July 7—In Bucharest, Rumania and the Soviet Union sign a new treaty of friendship, extending a pact concluded in 1948. Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin is head of his delegation.

SOUTH AFRICA

- July 22—The official South African policy towards the Chinese community is explained in Parliament, i.e., the Chinese form a separate racial group and may use white facilities so long as whites do not object.

SWITZERLAND

- July 20—The government announces that it will establish diplomatic relations with Albania.

THAILAND

(See *Intl, SEATO, War in Indochina*)

U.S.S.R.

- (See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Rumania*)
- July 2—Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, in a speech to the party's Central Committee, says that investment in the nation's agriculture will be increased by 70 per cent in the 1971-1975 five-year plan.
- A report in *The New York Times* states that Communist China has agreed to accept a new Soviet Ambassador who is reported to be Vladimir I. Stepakov.
- July 4—*Tass*, the official Soviet press agency, reports that Leonid Brezhnev, Communist party leader, has cancelled his scheduled trip to Rumania because of illness; Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin will go in his place.
- July 13—The Communist party's Central Committee announces the postponement until March, 1971, of the 24th party congress.
- July 15—In the second meeting of its 2-day summer session, the newly elected Supreme Soviet reappoints Aleksei N. Kosygin as Premier and Nikolai V. Podgorny as President.
- July 16—Authoritative sources in Moscow declare that the new Communist Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union will be Liu Hsin-chuan.

U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser concludes talks with Soviet leaders on the Middle East crisis.

July 18—Major increases are announced in the wholesale prices of meat, eggs, wool and milk products by the Soviet government.

Accompanied by President Nikolai Podgorny, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen travels to Kiev on the second day of his official visit to the Soviet Union.

July 19—The government announces increased bonuses to workers on state farms; the move is an effort to raise farm production.

July 26—West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel arrives in Moscow to begin formal negotiations for a treaty renouncing the use of force to settle disputes.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

July 7—Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home deplores the secret visit of the Irish Republic's Minister for External Affairs, Patrick J. Hillery, to Northern Ireland. (See also *Eire*.)

July 12—In talks with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers expresses U.S. opposition to British plans to resume the sale of arms to South Africa.

July 15—British ports are shut by a national dock strike.

July 16—The government declares a state of emergency as the dock strike continues.

July 22—Lord Carrington, the Minister of Defense, announces an agreement with West Germany to develop a combat aircraft.

July 25—Anthony Barber is appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer; he replaces Iain Macleod, who died on July 21.

July 28—Replacing Barber, Geoffrey Rippon is appointed to represent Britain in negotiations for entry into the Common Market. (See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

July 29—Union officials accept a compromise plan to settle the dock strike; employers accepted the plan July 27. Dock

workers will return to work on August 3.

Northern Ireland

July 4—Violence between Catholics and British troops in the Roman Catholic area of Belfast results in 5 deaths.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights and Race Relations

July 1—Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, chairman of the board of the N.A.A.C.P., refuses to back down on charges leveled at the administration of President Richard Nixon on June 29. Bishop Spottswood charged that the administration was anti-Negro.

July 2—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot L. Richardson threatens to cut off federal education funds to 3 segregated school districts if they fail to comply with desegregation guidelines within 30 days.

July 7—A curfew is applied in Asbury Park, New Jersey, following 4 days of violence; 43 persons are shot during the racial rioting.

July 9—Attorney General John N. Mitchell announces that the Justice Department has sued the state of Mississippi and school districts in 3 other states for failure to provide acceptable school desegregation plans.

July 10—The Internal Revenue Service announces that the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination will be revoked.

The curfew is lifted in Asbury Park.

July 12—Following 4 nights of racial disturbances in New Bedford, Mass., a curfew is imposed.

July 20—The Justice Department files suit against Libbey-Owens-Ford, the United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America and its Local 9 charging discrimination against women in job opportunities.

July 28—A federal court orders 7 agencies of the state of Alabama to cease discriminating against Negroes in hiring practices; state agencies that do not receive

substantial federal grants are not included in the order.

July 31—Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson announces that consultations aimed at the elimination of discrimination against women by federal contractors will be scheduled between Labor Department officials, women's groups, employers and unions.

A curfew is imposed in Hartford, Connecticut, following 3 days of rioting by Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

Economy

July 2—The Labor Department announces a decline in the unemployment rate for June, 1970, from 5 per cent of the labor force to 4.7 per cent.

July 21—The Labor Department announces that the consumer price index rose 0.4 per cent in June.

July 28—The government announces a "modest" deficit of \$2.9 billion in the federal budget for the fiscal year 1970.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, SEATO, Middle East Crisis, War in Indochina; Korea, Vietnam*)

July 1—In a televised interview with newsmen, President Richard Nixon announces the appointment of David K. E. Bruce as chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks.

July 4—Secretary of State William P. Rogers and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, meeting in Saigon, discuss the war in Indochina.

July 5—Rogers and South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Khiem, at an annual meeting of the Allied Nations Ministerial Conference in Saigon, appeal to their other allies to aid Cambodia.

July 6—On the final day of a 3-day visit to Saigon, Rogers meets with Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick, who explains his government's need for military equipment and economic aid.

A special 12-member committee of the House of Representatives, just returned from 2 weeks in Southeast Asia, submits a report which endorses the U.S.-South

Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia but which calls for the continued withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Vietnam.

July 8—A State Department spokesman says that the U.S. government is disturbed by reported prison conditions at Con Son, an island in South Vietnam. Two members of a special committee of the House of Representatives reporting on the war in Indochina described the prison conditions as atrocious.

The State Department reports that it has informed the government of South Korea of the U.S. intention to withdraw some of the 60,000 American troops from South Korea.

During a 3-day visit to Japan, Rogers confers with Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato.

July 10—Rogers begins a 2-day official visit to Britain.

July 13—President Nixon appoints Emory C. Swank as the first U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia since 1965.

July 14—Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly F. Dobrynin and Rogers meet to discuss European security.

July 16—British Prince Charles and Princess Anne begin a 2-day informal visit to the U.S.

July 18—West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel confers with President Nixon; Scheel expresses the belief that West Germany is supported by its allies in seeking a nonaggression pact with the U.S.S.R.

July 20—President Nixon supports South Vietnamese President Thieu's rejection of an "imposed coalition government," declaring that South Vietnam must have a government "chosen by the people."

July 23—Although the U.S. will proceed with some troop withdrawals from Korea this year, it is reported that attempts will be made to strengthen the South Korean forces before effecting sizeable reductions.

July 30—Speaking at a televised news conference, President Nixon says that Israel need not fear an Arab military build-up if she accepts the proposed cease-fire.

Government

July 2—George P. Shultz is sworn in as Director of the Office of Management and Budget. James D. Hodgson is sworn in as Secretary of Labor.

July 4—Crowds gather in Washington, D.C., for Honor America Day. More than 10,000 people attend the morning rally, and some 150,000 attend the evening ceremony.

July 7—The President signs legislation which extends until November, 1970, provisions which guarantee that Social Security beneficiaries will receive income increases of at least \$4 per month even though they receive public assistance.

July 9—President Nixon sends plans to Congress calling for the transfer of most pollution control activities to an independent Environmental Protection Agency and the creation of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration combining air and sea research. Both plans will take effect in 60 days unless either branch of Congress objects.

Dr. Martin Sweig, suspended chief administrative aide of House Speaker John W. McCormack (D., Mass.), is acquitted by a jury in a federal court in New York of conspiring to misuse the prestige of the Speaker's office. He is also acquitted of all but one charge of perjury.

July 10—President Nixon appoints 23 persons to the National Commission on Productivity.

July 11—J. Richard Lucas, nominated to direct the Bureau of Mines, has asked President Nixon to withdraw the nomination, it is announced.

July 13—The government announces new regulations limiting the size of demonstrations in front of the White House and in neighboring Lafayette Park. Gatherings of unlimited size will be permitted on the Ellipse and on the grounds of the Washington Monument.

A Federal Bureau of Investigation report calls the Black Panther party the "most dangerous and violence-prone of all extremist groups."

July 14—Richard Blumenthal denies reports that his decision to decline the appointment as director of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) was based on disagreements with administration policies dealing with the poor.

President Nixon meets in Kentucky with state governors who are members of the Appalachian Regional Commission; he encourages the governors to back his proposals for federal revenue sharing and welfare reform.

July 15—The Justice Department awards grants totaling \$11 million to help finance college courses for law enforcement personnel.

July 17—Robert P. Mayo resigns as a counselor to the President.

July 20—The House passes a bill designed to generate 1.3 million new housing units. The measure now goes to the President.

July 23—The Senate approves, in a 54-33 vote, a District of Columbia crime control bill, including provisions for preventive custody and "no-knock" police entry. The measure now goes to the President.

A report in *The Akron Beacon Journal* says that a Justice Department analysis of an F.B.I. report concluded that the shooting by National Guardsmen which resulted in the deaths of 4 Kent State University students was unnecessary.

President Nixon nominates Sherman Edward Unger to the Federal Communications Commission.

July 24—Attorney General Mitchell authorizes the Justice Department to file suits against 8 companies on charges of dumping mercury into waterways.

The President signs the housing bill.

The President travels to Fargo, N.D., and Salt Lake City on his way to the Western White House at San Clemente, California.

July 28—The Senate passes a \$4.4-billion education bill which now goes to the President; the measure provides \$453 million more than the President's budget requested.

July 29—The President signs the District of Columbia crime control bill.

July 30—The Treasury Department submits proposals to Congress calling for taxes on lead additives in gasoline; the proposed legislation also calls for measures to speed up the collection of estate and gift taxes.

Labor

July 3—Chicago area truck drivers win an increase of \$1.65 an hour over 36 months; other members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters receive comparable increases.

July 7—President Nixon orders a halt in the strike of railroad firemen and their union allies under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The union men had struck 3 of the nation's largest railroads.

July 8—In the wake of the presidential order, trainmen return to work for a 60-day period while a 3-man emergency board investigates the dispute.

July 29—Twenty-six table grape growers and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee sign contracts; 65 per cent of the growers are now unionized.

Military

July 1—The Selective Service System holds the second annual lottery for the military draft.

July 2—The National Selective Service Youth Advisory Committee suggests to Curtis W. Tarr, Director of the Selective Service System, the lowering of the draft age to 18, the elimination of student deferments and the ultimate creation of an all-volunteer force.

July 6—Tarr issues written guidelines to local draft boards on granting conscientious objector status; the criteria include evaluations of the sincerity of the applicant's beliefs.

July 9—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird says that the Soviet Union is continuing its buildup of intercontinental ballistic missiles at an intensive rate.

July 27—Defense Secretary Laird announces that, in the future, defense contracts will

be let out in stages rather than as package contracts as was formerly the practice.

July 29—Representative Cornelius Gallagher (D., N.J.) announces that the Army plans to move 2 trainloads of rockets filled with nerve gas through the South to be dumped in the Atlantic Ocean.

Politics

July 7—During time made available to the Democratic National Committee by the Columbia Broadcasting System, Lawrence F. O'Brien, chairman of the Democratic Committee, attacks the Nixon administration's handling of economic and social problems and the Cambodian military incursion.

July 16—Maryland Representative Rogers C. B. Morton, the Republican national chairman, attacks the Democrats for demanding equal time to reply to the President's reports to the nation.

URUGUAY

July 31—The Tupamaros, a group of Marxist-oriented urban guerrillas, kidnap the Brazilian consul to Uruguay and the chief U.S. adviser to the Uruguayan police force; attempts are made to kidnap 2 other U.S. officials.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 7—President Nguyen Van Thieu discloses that U.S. President Nixon has promised the South Vietnamese government \$100 million to build housing for soldiers and their families.

July 11—Three American news correspondents and about 30 Vietnamese students are arrested during a demonstration for peace.

July 15—Nguyen Van Thieu declares that he will crush movements calling for surrender to the Communists.

July 21—The government announces that it has suspended use of the controversial prison cells at Con Son pending improvements. (See *U.S., Foreign Policy*, July 8.)

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